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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1973, the Supreme Court considered the question of
whether Percy Green, a former employee at a McDonnell Douglas
plant, could establish a claim of race discrimination based on
circumstantial evidence.' The Court held that Mr. Green could
establish his claim through circumstantial evidence and then
enunciated what is now referred to as the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting test.2

1. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (setting out "to
clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action challenging employment
discrimination").
2. See id. at 802 (holding that the plaintiff carries the initial burden to show
discrimination, and if satisfied, the burden then shifts to the employer to put forth a
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the employee); id. at 804 (noting that after
defendant presents legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, plaintiff must
demonstrate the reason is pretextual). For convenience, I have referred to McDonnell
Douglas as a singular test. However, McDonnell Douglas "is not a monolithic test, but
rather a collection of tests gathered rather deceptively under one name." Sandra F.
Sperino, Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the
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Since 1973, both courts and litigants have struggled to
understand and apply the three-step burden-shifting framework.
Commentators have noted that "although the Supreme Court
initially adopted the McDonnell Douglas approach to make it
easier for plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case, the courts of
appeals now use this construct to defeat plaintiffs' claims."' Some
members of the court have noted that the numerous and
complicated frameworks used in the employment context have
resulted in employment law becoming "difficult for the bench and
bar,"4 and that "[flower courts long have had difficulty applying
McDonnell Douglas... ." One commentator has described the
test as having "befuddled most of those who have attempted to
master it" and calls the burden-shifting framework "complex"
and "somewhat Byzantine."' Perhaps even more surprising than
the test's continued viability is the fact that few courts question
its authority or statutory basis.'
More than 30 years after the McDonnell Douglas decision
was handed down, fundamental disagreements still exist within
the circuits about how it should be applied. Some within the
academic community even question its continued viability and
applicability, based on subsequent amendments to Title VII. 9
This Article argues that McDonnell Douglas has proven
McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HouS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 1, on
file with Author).
3.
Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use
of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 229 (1993)
(footnote omitted).
4.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
5.
Id. at 291.
6.
Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
Individual DisparateTreatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 859 (2004).
7.
Id. at 862; see also Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell
Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in DiscriminationCases, 64 BROOK.
L. REV. 659, 659 & n.3 (1998) (indicating how courts have struggled with the test).
8.
But see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Absent
from [the McDonnell Douglas] opinion was any justification or authority for [the burdenshifting] scheme.").
9.
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 934 (2005) ("The ramifications of Desert Palace are
as yet unclear, but the broadest view is that the case collapsed all individual disparate
treatment cases into a single analytical method, thereby effectively destroying McDonnell
Douglas. The decision, however, can be read more narrowly. Because footnote one
specifies that the Court was not deciding the effects of this decision 'outside of the mixedmotive context,' McDonnell Douglas may continue to structure some cases, although its
viability under Title VII is suspect." (footnote omitted) (quoting Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 n.1 (2003)); see also William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave
and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUs. L. REV. 1549, 1566 (2005) (removing "the shadow of
McDonnellDouglas's continuing viability once and for all").
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unsatisfactory in analyzing discrimination claims for two reasons
related to statutory construction. First, the Supreme Court
provided no guidance on how the test is analytically connected to
the statute itself." Indeed, a close examination demonstrates
that the test draws little support from the text, intent, or purpose
of Title VII.' Second, the Court failed to provide any explanation
why such a departure from the express statutory language was
warranted. 2 The pre-1973 case law and the McDonnell Douglas
opinion itself do not suggest that the test was necessary to give
meaning to ambiguous statutory language or to provide guidance
to lower courts struggling with how to analyze claims. These
omissions lead to serious concerns about whether the test was
created within acceptable bounds of statutory construction.
Over the years, the statutory underpinnings of McDonnell
Douglas have received surprisingly little attention and
criticism.13 This is largely due to explanations of the framework
as merely an evidentiary standard. 4 If Title VII operates merely
as an evidentiary standard, the theory goes, then the Supreme
Court, through its supervisory powers, has the ability to create
the shifting burdens of production and persuasion to assist lower
courts in their decisionmaking."5 This belief about McDonnell
Douglas is undermined by recent cases holding that trial courts
should not instruct juries about the three-part framework."
10.
See Mark A. Schuman, The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks and the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 70 (1993) ("The McDonnell Douglas Court gave no justification or
authority for its establishment of this structure of proof .. ").
11.
Id. (noting that the Court did not discuss passages from Title VII, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, or the Act's legislative history).
12.
Id. (observing that "[nlo Justice bothered to concur and explain his own
rationale for the holding of the case").
13.
Id. (finding that subsequent cases took the McDonnell Douglas structure for
granted).
14.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) ("The prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas ...is an evidentiary standard....").
15.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993); cf Mitchell N.
Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 93-95 (2004) (explaining why
courts are allowed to create decision rules in the constitutional context).
16.
Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 998 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he
instructions should not 'lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize poorly
understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimination.'" (quoting Messina
v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990))); Kanida v. Gulf Coast
Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[D]istrict courts should not frame jury
instructions based upon the intricacies of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
analysis."); Sanders v. New York City Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir.
2004) ("Explaining [the burden shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas] to the jury in the
charge, we believe, is more likely to confuse rather than enlighten the members of the
jury."); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 539-41 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that "it is error to charge the jury with the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima
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Thus, in many circuits, we are left with an "evidentiary
framework" that is not supposed to play a role in the jury's
deliberations. 7 As its courtroom use diminishes, it becomes
increasingly problematic to justify McDonnell Douglas as an
evidentiary standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As the evidentiary-standard justification for McDonnell
Douglas erodes, it is important to examine the test's legal
heritage. This Article attempts to map the accepted methods of
statutory construction and to demonstrate that the McDonnell
Douglas test is not the product of any accepted methodology or
combination of methodologies. Instead, the Court elevated the
factual basis for one case into a test that courts now try to apply
universally, albeit with modification. The result is a test that is
both underinclusive and overinclusive, requiring plaintiffs to
prove facts that are unnecessary to establish discrimination and
robbing defendants of some of their prerogatives under the
common law to make employment decisions. The Article then
continues by demonstrating why the framework is no longer
justified as an evidentiary standard and argues that even if such
a characterization were appropriate, McDonnell Douglas's flaws
outweigh any benefits it once had as such a standard.
This Article is not intended to engage in a discussion about
the relative merits of the tools used by the court in interpreting
statutes, but merely to demonstrate that the court does not
appear to have relied on any of these tools in creating the now
familiar McDonnell Douglas framework. This Article argues from
two premises. First, the Court failed to provide any meaningful
guidance regarding how the framework comports with the plain
meaning of the statute, its legislative intent, or the statute's
broader remedial purposes. Indeed, the framework is not so
supported; nor does it appear to be supported by a common law
approach to statutory construction. Second, the Article questions
whether the lack of justification for such a departure warrants a
determination that the standard itself is illegitimate.
Part II of the Article begins with a discussion of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green itself, describing the somewhat narrow
factual circumstances that led to the adoption of the now
ubiquitous three-part burden-shifting framework. Part III
discusses four theories of statutory construction-plain meaning,
intentionalism, purposivism, and common law decisionmakingand demonstrates that the test created by the courts does not
facie case").
17.
See Sanghvi, 328 F.3d at 541 (noting that the jury should focus on "one essential
question: whether the plaintiff is a victim of intentional discrimination").
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comport well with any accepted methodology. Part IV examines
why characterization of the test as merely an evidentiary
framework may have stymied courts from considering whether a
satisfactory link existed between Title VII and the framework.
The section also examines why it is no longer satisfying to
characterize the test merely as an "evidentiary framework."
Part V discusses the effect the Court's straying from the
statutory text had on the development of employment law,
arguing that the test needlessly created years of circuit splits and
debate over intricacies of the test itself. The Article concludes by
arguing that the McDonnell Douglas test should be abolished and
replaced with a standard that tracks the statutory language in
Title VII and by discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the
suggested proof regime.
II. GETTING BACK TO WHERE WE STARTED: AN EXAMINATION OF
GREEN V. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

A. The Case of Percy Green
1. Proceedings Before the District Court. The facts of
McDonnell Douglas v. Green are rather straightforward. Plaintiff
Percy Green had been employed by McDonnell Douglas since
1956.18 He was rated average as a mechanic, and his employment
record demonstrated that his work was viewed as satisfactory. 9
In 1963, plaintiff applied to work in the Electronic Equipment
Division, as a nonunion laboratory technician." The supervisors
in the Electronic Equipment Division informed Mr. Green that if
he transferred into the department, there was a possibility of a
layoff, due to the short term of the project upon which they were
working." Mr. Green accepted a position in the Electronic
Equipment Division.22
In the spring of 1964, employees in the Electronic
Equipment Division were laid off; however, Mr. Green was not
one of these employees.2 3 It became clear that more employees in
the department would be laid off.2 4 The company used a
18.
Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 847 (E.D. Mo. 1970), affd
in part, rev'd in part,463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 847-48.
22.
Id. at 848.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
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semiannual ranking of employees to determine which employees
would be laid off.25 The company tried to place employees on the
layoff list in other jobs within the company, and gave a voluntary
test "to help determine the qualifications of the men for higher
job classifications
which were open."26 Plaintiff chose not to take
27
the test.
It was undisputed that plaintiff had been involved in civil
rights related protest activities since the early 1960s."8 During
meetings related to the layoff, Mr. Green told company officials
that he believed he was being laid off because of his participation
in these activities.29 The company officials told Mr. Green this
was not the case." On August 28, 1964, Mr. Green and eight
other technicians were laid off.3
After his layoff, Mr. Green engaged in numerous protests
against McDonnell Douglas, including writing letters, filing
charges and picketing.32 In October of 1964, Mr. Green, along
with other members of the Congress on Racial Equality, stopped
their cars on the main roads to McDonnell Douglas's plant during
the time of a shift change." Mr. Green led a second
demonstration that caused McDonnell Douglas's employees to be
locked in the building at the end of their work day. 4
On July 26, 1965, Mr. Green applied for a position at
McDonnell Douglas. 5 Even though he was qualified, he was not
offered the job. 6 The defendant rejected the plaintiff due to his
involvement in the demonstrations, which the company
considered to be illegal actions. 7
Mr. Green brought two claims against McDonnell Douglas."
First, he claimed that his original 1964 layoff violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 because he was fired due to his race and participation in
civil rights activities. 9 Second, Mr. Green claimed that the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 849.
Id.
Id. at 850-51.
Id.
Id.
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company violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) by
refusing to rehire him based on his race, his participation in civil
rights activities, and his opposition of practices that were deemed
unlawful under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40
Prior to the trial on the merits, the trial court dismissed
plaintiffs Title VII claim that the company refused to rehire him
based on his race.4 ' The trial court held that because the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had not issued a
reasonable cause finding on plaintiffs refusal to rehire claim
based on race, the court did not have jurisdiction to consider this
claim.42 However, plaintiffs section 1981 claim that he was not
rehired based on his race still remained for resolution by the trial
court. 3
The trial court dismissed the layoff claim as untimely,
leaving the refusal to rehire claims for trial by the court.44 In
ruling on the discrimination and retaliation claims, the trial
court articulated that "the controlling and ultimate fact questions
are: (1) whether the plaintiffs misconduct is sufficient to justify
defendant's refusal to rehire, and (2) whether the 'stall in' and
the 'lock in' are the real reasons for defendant's refusal to rehire
the plaintiff."4 5 The trial court held that the refusal to rehire
(brought under section 1981) was not based on racial prejudice.46
Further, the trial court found that plaintiffs participation in the
stall-in and lock-in constituted illegal activities, and that the
company could legitimately base its decision not to rehire
plaintiff on his participation in this illegal conduct.47
2. Proceedings Before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Mr. Green raised several issues on appeal." Among other things,
Mr. Green argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his
layoff claim by concluding that his involvement in the lock-in and
stall-in was not protected by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and by

40. Id.
41.
Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1969),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
42. Id.
43.
See id. (dismissing the Title VII claim); see also Green, 318 F. Supp. at 851
(holding that plaintiffs § 1981 claim was barred by the statute of limitations).
44.
Green, 318 F. Supp. at 849.
45.
Id. at 850.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 851.
48.
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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"striking the allegations of the complaint which charged
McDonnell with denying him employment for reasons of race." 9
Even though the Eighth Circuit's opinion was the result of a
three-judge panel, it produced a majority opinion, a concurring
opinion, and a dissenting opinion." After briefs were submitted
for rehearing en banc, the majority submitted an altered version
of section V of the opinion, which drew a supplemental dissent.5
The three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit unanimously
determined that the layoff claim was barred by a five-year
statute of limitations. 2 In a portion of the decision joined by two
judges, the Eighth Circuit panel concluded that the evidence
before the trial court did not support a claim that plaintiff
actively participated in a lock-in;5 8 therefore, the appeals court
considered only whether the plaintiffs involvement in the stall-in
was a nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory basis for his
discharge. 4 The panel also unanimously agreed that the
retaliation provisions of Title VII did not protect individuals who
engaged in illegal activity as a form of protest and that the stallin fit within this category."
The Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred in
striking plaintiffs Title VII claim for refusal to rehire based on
race because the plaintiff was not required to have a reasonable
cause finding from the EEOC to proceed on such a claim. 6

49.
Id. at 340.
50.
Id. at 337. This fact was not lost on the Supreme Court. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("The two opinions of the Court of Appeals and
the several opinions of the three judges of that court attempted, with a notable lack of
harmony, to state the applicable rules as to burden of proof and how this shifts upon the
making of a prima facie case.").
51.
Green, 463 F.2d at 353 (Johnsen, J., dissenting).
52.
Id. at 340-41 (majority opinion).
53.
Id. at 341. The question asked by the Court of Appeals regarding the lock-in is
actually the wrong question. The Court of Appeals should have asked whether McDonnell
Douglas reasonably believed that the plaintiff participated in the lock-in. See Singh v.
Shoney's, Inc., 64 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that a plaintiff who claimed that
coworkers fabricated allegations leading to her discharge must demonstrate that her
employer did not reasonably believe those allegations when it terminated her); cf Hughes
v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that employer's mistaken belief that
plaintiff was less qualified for the position is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions). The key issue in both disparate treatment and retaliation cases is the motive
of the decisionmaker. See, e.g., Williams v. Frank, 757 F. Supp. 112, 116 (D. Mass. 1991),
affd, 959 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1992). Thus, even if Mr. Green had not participated in the
lock-in or had only tangentially participated, a finding on behalf of the company still could
have been appropriate, if the company reasonably believed that Mr. Green had engaged in
such activity.
54.
Green, 463 F.2d at 341.
55.
Id.
Id. at 342.
56.
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Because the dismissal of this claim may have hindered plaintiff's
presentation of evidence, the appeals court determined that the
plaintiff should have an additional opportunity to make his claim
that the dismissal was based on race and violated Title VII.
It would have been proper for the Eighth Circuit to end its
analysis there. However, in section V of the majority opinion, the
panel began to create the outlines of what would later become the
McDonnell Douglas test.58 The panel indicated that "[olur prior
decisions make clear that, in cases presenting questions of
discriminatory hiring practices, employment decisions based on
subjective, rather than objective, criteria carry little weight in
rebutting charges of discrimination."5 9 The Court did not cite any
statutory principle for this proposition, but rather cited two
cases: Moore v. Board of Education" and Carter v. Gallagher.6
The panel continued by quoting a disparate impact case, Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.,62 stating, "'If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job
63
performance, the practice is prohibited.'
The panel went on to say that a plaintiff presents a prima
facie case of discrimination when he "demonstrates that he
possesses the qualifications to fill a job opening and that he was
denied the job." 4 Once the prima facie case is proven, "the burden
passes to the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship
between the reasons offered for denying employment and the
requirements of the job."65 The court further indicated that
McDonnell Douglas would essentially be required to prove "that
Green's participation in the 'stall-in' would impede his ability to
perform the job for which he applied." 66 The court provided no
statutory or case support for these propositions.67

57.
Id. at 343.
58.
Id. at 343-44.
59.
Id. at 343.
60.
Moore v. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1971).
61.
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
62.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
63.
Green, 463 F.2d at 343 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
64. Id. at 344.
65.
Id.
66. Id.
67.
Although the discussion in the original section V provides insight into the
court's rationale, it appears that the test articulated in that original section was
superseded by the test articulated in the substituted section V. See id. at 353 (Johnsen, J.
dissenting). However, it should be noted that the panel adopted portions of its earlier test
in the modified section. See id. at 353-54 (clarifying differences between the original
section V opinion and the modified opinion and noting that the district court is likely to be
confused by the modifications).
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In the amended section V of the opinion, the court clarified
that "[w]hen a black man demonstrates that he possesses the
qualifications to fill a job opening and that he has been denied
the job which continues to remain open, we think he presents a
prima facie case of racial discrimination."6 8 The panel instructed
that on remand, "Green should be given the opportunity to show
that these reasons offered by the company were pretextual, or
otherwise show the presence of racially discriminatory hiring
practices by McDonnell which affected its decision."69 Again, the
appeals court gave no statutory (or other) support for such a test.
3. Proceedings Before the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court characterized the McDonnell Douglas case as addressing
"the proper order and nature of proof" required to prove
discrimination under Title VII. 7 ° After reiterating the factual
context of the case, the Supreme Court laid out the now familiar
burden-shifting framework. 1 The Court held:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications....
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection.72
The plaintiff then has the opportunity to demonstrate that
the defendant's reason for the rejection was simply pretext.7 3 The
court noted that "[t]he facts [required to establish a prima facie
case] necessarily will vary," depending on the factual scenario. 74
The three-part burden-shifting framework was a significant
change from the tests that other lower courts previously had
used in disparate treatment discrimination cases. Prior to
McDonnell Douglas, other courts had applied a less regimented
standard, requiring that a plaintiff prove by a preponderance of
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 353.
Id. at 353 (footnote omitted).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
See id. at 801-03.
Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 804.
Id. at 802 n.13.
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the evidence that the employer was guilty of a discriminatory act
and noting that this determination was one that should be made
on a case-by-case basis.75 As one court indicated:
The burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff and the court is
concerned about the difficulty often inherent therein.
Normally, it can be aided by an overall statistical showing
but in a limited case such as this it is dependent upon
inferences of motive, intent and state of mind often from
very slight circumstances. For claimant and counsel, this is
not an easy task. In such instances, all a court can do is
evaluate these intangibles through the witnesses and weigh
the overall situation and performance of the employer."
Under the test enunciated by some circuits prior to
McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff met this burden, the
employer could prevail by proving, as an affirmative defense,
that "he failed to hire a person for reasons which would
exonerate him."77 The Court did not discuss this prior case law in
its McDonnell Douglas decision and did not explain why it was
lowering the employer's burden from an affirmative defense to a
mere burden of production."
Not only did the Court fail to place its newly created test
within the context of the then developing body of disparate
treatment case law, it also failed to justify the standard with an
adequate statutory basis.79 Surprisingly, in crafting the
McDonnell Douglas test, the Court referenced the operative
language of Title VII, but did not connect this language with the
test it was creating."s The Court never stated that it had
75.
See Reid v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that
plaintiff had the burden of proving that refusal to hire was based on protected trait);
Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., No. 6580, 1971 WL 150, at *5 (W.D. Ky.
June 23, 1971) ("Questions of whether employer was guilty of discriminatory practice is
basically one of fact for determination on case by case basis."), aftd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir.
1972).
76.
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 442 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1971).
77.
Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972).
78.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03. A discussion of the perceived
inadequacies of the tests existing prior to McDonnell Douglas would have been helpful in
understanding the rationale behind the highly regimented and complex structure created
by the Court.
79.
Unfortunately, this frustration may just be a common problem in statutory
construction. Cf S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why
Disability Law Claims are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 663-64 (2001) (expressing
frustration with courts' refusal to fully explain statutory construction issues under ADA
and expressing belief that courts often borrow from Title VII in considering ADA claims
without first looking at plain language and legislative history).
80.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 800-04 ("The language of Title VII
makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment
opportunities .. ").
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consulted the legislative history of the statute in creating the
test.81 And, although the Court discussed the broader purposes of
Title VII in the McDonnell Douglas decision, it did not
specifically discuss how these purposes were supported by the
test articulated by the Court.82
Nor did the opinion provide an extra-statutory basis for its
opinion, such as a need to provide concrete guidance to lower
courts
or
to
operationalize
an
ambiguous
statute."3
Unfortunately, given the subsequent importance of the
McDonnell Douglas standard, the opinion articulating the
standard does not provide an adequate historical, statutory, or
philosophical basis for its holding." Nor does it adequately
explain
how practitioners or judges should use the newly minted
85
test.
B. Later Justificationfor and Expansion of McDonnell Douglas
Although it did not undertake to do so in the McDonnell
Douglas opinion itself, the Court later tried to justify the origin of
McDonnell Douglas and provide the decision with a sounder legal
heritage." In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court indicated
that the McDonnell Douglas framework was rendered "according
to traditional practice" that provides the Court with the ability to
"establish certain modes and orders of proof."" The Court also
later described the McDonnell Douglas standard as "a procedural
device, " " as "merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the
evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination,"" and as simply a means of
"arranging the presentation of evidence." ° Notably, the court has
expressed a belief that McDonnell Douglas serves "to assure that

81.
Id.
82.
Id. (noting that Congress acted "to assure equality of employment opportunities
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens").
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978).
87.
St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 514.
88.
Id. at 521.
89.
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
90.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 986; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
510 (2002) (clarifying that the "McDonnell Douglas [prima facie case] is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement").
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the 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of
direct evidence."' 91
The McDonnell Douglas framework is now the most widely
used method for establishing circumstantial evidence of
discrimination in Title VII cases. 2 Indeed, many circuits recite
that there are two methods by which plaintiffs may proceed on
disparate treatment claims-either through direct evidence or
the McDonnell Douglas framework." And, even though the Court
has taken great care to explain that the factors of the test are
flexible and should change with the circumstances of each case,94
plaintiffs advocating that modifications to the test should be
made in a particular instance often face a skeptical and
unyielding court.95

91.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (alteration in
original) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).
92.
See Michael Evan Gold, Towards a Unified Theory of the Law of Employment
Discrimination, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 184 (2001) (identifying the
McDonnell Douglas formula as "the most commonly used" of several methods of proving
discrimination via indirect evidence).
93.
See Gamboa v. Am. Airlines, 170 F. App'x 610, 612 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is used to review claims based on
circumstantial evidence, but not claims based on direct evidence); Jones v. United Space
Alliance, L.L.C., 170 F. App'x 52, 56 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Absent direct evidence of an
employer's discriminatory motive, a plaintiff may establish his case through
circumstantial evidence, using the burden-shifting framework established by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas .... ."); Hill v. Forum Health, 167 F. App'x 448,
451-52 (6th Cir. 2006) (observing that because the plaintiff presented no direct evidence,
the lower court used the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate circumstantial
evidence). But see Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768 n.3 (11th Cir.
2005) ("We emphasize that the McDonnell Douglas ...framework remains only one
method by which the plaintiff can prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence.");
EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 940 (4th Cir. 1992) (explaining that, as an
alternative to McDonnell Douglas, "[t]he plaintiff may meet this burden under the
ordinary standards of proof by direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently
probative of the issue"); Gold, supra note 92, at 196-97 (arguing that statistical evidence
and evidence of disparate treatment can also be used to prove discrimination through
circumstantial evidence, outside the McDonnell Douglas standard).
94.
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 ("[Tihe precise requirements of a prima facie case
can vary depending on the context and were 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic.'" (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577)).
95.
See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996)
(reversing the lower court's refusal to modify the elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case); Pivirotto v.
Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a plaintiff is
not required to prove he was replaced by someone outside the protected class as part of a
prima facie case, but noting that in many prior cases it appeared this was an element). As
Deborah Malamud notes, lower courts may have difficulty making such determinations
because "[tihe [Supreme] Court has created rule-like formulations, with the hope that the
lower courts will bend them correctly, without any principled guidance." Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229,
2313 (1995).
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The reach of McDonnell Douglas also has been expanded
from a Title VII tool to a test that is now used when analyzing
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)," the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),97 and
discrimination cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.98
Additionally, the McDonnell Douglas standard has been used to
determine whether discrimination is established under various
state antidiscrimination statutes.99 Given the significance of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, it is important that we
understand whether it is supported by Title VII.
C.

Why a Statutory Examination Matters

An examination of the statutory underpinnings of
McDonnell Douglas is especially important now, when the test is
coming under criticism for numerous deficiencies. 0 One of the
prominent criticisms of the McDonnell Douglas test is that it
distracts the court from considering whether discrimination took
place, and instead focuses on a rather mechanized and
procedural framework. 0 ' Although the specific ways in which this

96.
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49-51 (2003) (noting that the lower
court correctly attempted to apply the McDonnell Douglas standard to the ADA claim but
erred in its application).
97.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (assuming
that the McDonnell Douglas framework is appropriate in an ADEA context, but noting
that the Court has never squarely addressed the issue).
98.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993) (considering the
McDonnell Douglas framework "fully applicable to racial-discrimination-in-employment
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983").
99.
Gamboa v. Am. Airlines, 170 F. App'x 610, 612 (lth Cir. 2006) (applying the
McDonnell Douglas standard to claims asserted under a Florida antidiscrimination
statute); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 (10th Cir. 1999) (New Mexico statute);
Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) (New York statute);
Carpenter v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 165 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (District of
Columbia statute); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 1999)
(Massachusetts statute); Lee v. Minn. Dep't of Commerce, 157 F.3d 1130, 1133 (8th Cir.
1998) (Minnesota statute); Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1998)
(Louisiana statute); Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 956 (3d Cir. 1996) (New
Jersey statute); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 n.8 (6th Cir.
1994) (Kentucky statute); Flentje v. First Nat'l Bank of Wynne, 11 S.W.3d 531, 536-38
(Ark. 2000) (Arkansas statute).
100.
See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication
Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103, 124 (2005) ("[Tlhe Court
appears to allow trial judges to require far more evidence than should be sufficient to
avoid summary judgment."); Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Danger of Practicing
Law as Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159, 183 (2005) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas test has
obscured the failure of courts to apply a stricter definition of discrimination than exists or
than is required by our antidiscrimination laws.").
101.
Corbett, supra note 9, at 1576-77 ("Stripped of procedural significance and
having no place in the organization and presentation of evidence at trial, what is left for
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diversion happens are detailed in Part III, infra, this criticism is
best demonstrated by a concrete example.
Consider the facts of Jowers v. Lakeside Family and
Children's Services.' Lynn Jowers, the plaintiff in the case,
03
worked as a counselor for abused and underprivileged youth.
Six years after the plaintiff was hired, his employer implemented
a fingerprinting policy that applied to all staff."' As a result of
the fingerprint analysis, the employer discovered that plaintiff
pled guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance six months
prior to his hiring.0 1 Plaintiff admitted to pleading guilty, but
10 6
denied that he committed the conduct underlying the charges.
On his employment application plaintiff had indicated that he
had not been convicted of a felony in the past seven years. 7
Plaintiff was terminated from his position.' 8 The employer stated
that
it
terminated
the
employee
because
of the
misrepresentations on his employment application.' 9
Plaintiff asserted that he was not terminated because he
withheld information, but rather based on his race and color."0
The judge indicated that, through his own deposition testimony,
the "[pilaintiff ha[d] produced personal anecdotes of racially
charged, verbal exchanges with one of his co-workers, and his
supervisor...
In considering the plaintiffs wrongful termination claim, the
court cited the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case."2 The court
granted summary judgment on behalf of the employer on
plaintiffs wrongful termination claim based on plaintiff's failure
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination."' The court's
analysis in support of summary judgment presents an especially

McDonnell Douglas? It is a mere shadow of its former self, and one that will confuse and
distract us and generally work mischief if it is permitted to linger.").
102. Jowers v. Lakeside Family & Children's Servs., No. 03 Civ. 8730 (LMS), 2005
WL 3134019 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *2.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109. Id. at *2 n.3.
110.
Id. at *2. In addition, plaintiff asserted that he was terminated on the basis of
his gender. Id. Plaintiff also asserted claims of retaliation and workplace harassment. Id.
at *3.
111.
Id. at *7.
112.
Id. at *6.
113. Id. at *6-8.
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compelling case of how the McDonnell Douglas framework easily
diverts courts from the question of discrimination."'
The first reason the court provided for the propriety of
summary judgment was that the plaintiff had not satisfactorily
performed the duties of his position. "5 The employer had not
asserted that the plaintiffs termination was related to his job
performance in any way or that plaintiffs background made him
unqualified for the job in question." 6 Yet, the court spends more
than a page of a rather short opinion discussing plaintiffs
performance evaluations."7 Then, even though the court admitted
that there were "differing versions regarding the Plaintiffs
quality of work," the court found that plaintiff had not
established this prong of the McDonnell Douglas test."8
The court then articulated the fourth prong of the test as
requiring plaintiff to show "the adverse employment action gave
rise to an inference of discrimination."" Even though the
plaintiff presented deposition testimony of racially charged
conversations with his supervisor and described several incidents
where his supervisor and a co-worker used racial epithets, the
court found that plaintiff could not prevail on the fourth prong of
the McDonnell Douglas test because he failed to produce "other
supporting evidence of such racial
tension" or witnesses to
2
support his deposition testimony.1 0
The court then assumed, for the sake of argument, that the
plaintiff could prevail on his prima facie case.' Accepting the
plaintiffs admitted guilty plea to the felony conviction as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, the
court then found that the plaintiff failed to meet his final burden
under the McDonnell Douglas test-to rebut the employer's
reason and to produce evidence suggesting that a protected trait
was the motivation for the termination.'
In reaching this
conclusion, the court again discounted plaintiffs deposition
testimony regarding racially charged conversations in the
workplace.'

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *2 n.3.
See id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7, *10.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id.
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Without making any conclusions about the proper resolution
of this case or about whether the court properly followed the
federal summary judgment standard, this case highlights many
of the ways in which McDonnell Douglas leads courts away from
the real issues presented for resolution. The issue in this case
was whether plaintiffs evidence of racially charged conversations
with his supervisor could cause a reasonable jury to believe that
he was terminated based on his race, in light of plaintiffs
admitted
misrepresentations on his application and his guilty
124
plea.
The opinion never directly engages this question. Instead, it
spends a great deal of time focusing on the red herring of job
qualifications. 125 The opinion confuses the various burdens
required under the framework (as well as the federal summary
judgment standard) and weighs the evidence presented by both
parties when considering the prima facie case. The court then
treats this as a simple pretext case, without considering the
possibility that a single-motive, pretext analysis may not be
appropriate because both parties admitted that the plaintiff had
presented false information to the employer.126 The court then
discounts the plaintiffs deposition testimony of racially charged
conversations, finding that it failed to rebut the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.127 The
opinion also fails to discuss these racially charged conversations
in determining whether the plaintiff actually had direct evidence
of discrimination, which would remove his claims from the proper
purview of the McDonnell Douglas test. Each of these failings
points to significant problems with the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry. 2 '

124.
Id. at *2.
125.
Id. at *6-8.
126.
Id. at *8.
127.
Id. at *7.
128.
A potential criticism of using a handful of cases to provide concrete examples of
the problems with the McDonnell Douglas test is that the chosen examples may represent
outlying cases where a particular judge misapplied a standard or perhaps manipulated
the standard to reach a desired result. However, the judiciary itself has confirmed its
belief that the McDonnell Douglas test leads courts awry in making decisions about
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th
Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., writing separately) ("The McDonnell Douglas framework only
creates confusion and distracts courts from 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel
non.'" (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983))).
"Rather than concentrating on what should be the focus of attention-whether the
evidence supports a finding of unlawful discrimination-courts focus on the isolated
components of the McDonnell Douglas framework, losing sight of the ultimate issue." Id.
at 1224; see also Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 2000)
("While the discrete stages are meant to facilitate litigants and courts in reaching and
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Another significant weakness of the test is its feigned
malleability. Many courts recite that the McDonnell Douglas test
is flexible, and its factors may change according to the facts of
the case before the court.' 9 Despite this recognition, courts often
refuse to adapt the factors of the test, even when doing so
provides a better mechanism for ferreting out whether
discrimination occurred.13
For example, in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp.,"" the plaintiff, who was 56 years old, alleged that he was
terminated because of his age."2 The plaintiff was replaced by a
person who was 40 years old.'33 When thinking about
discrimination in common sense terms, it seems feasible that a
company could be committing age discrimination when it
terminates an employee and hires another individual 16 years
his junior. However, both the district court and the court of
appeals in the Consolidated Coin case held the plaintiff to a
somewhat rigid prima facie case, with the district court
dismissing the case at summary judgment and the appeals court
affirming that dismissal.3 4 Both of the lower courts held that the
plaintiff could not prove discrimination because he could not
establish a factor of the McDonnell Douglas test-that he was
replaced by someone outside of his protected class. 3'
Although the Supreme Court later relieved plaintiffs of the
burden of proving that a replacement employee was outside of
the ADEA's protected class, the plaintiff in this case was
required to undertake three years of additional litigation after
the denial of summary judgment to obtain this result.'36 For

resolving that ultimate question of discrimination, when misapplied, they tend to distract
courts from the central issue.").
129.
See, e.g., supra note 94 and accompanying text (exemplifying the Court's
characterization of the McDonnell Douglas framework as flexible).
130.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing how plaintiffs who
attempt to convince courts that modifications to the McDonnell Douglas standard are
necessary are often met with skepticism).
131.
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
132.
Id. at 309.
133.
Id. at 310.
134.
Id. at 309-10.
135.
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546-48 (4th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 517 U.S. 308 (1996); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155,
157-58 (W.D.N.C. 1993), affd, 56 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
136.
The district court originally granted summary judgment in the employer's favor
in 1993. O'Connor, 829 F. Supp. at 159-60. Ironically, on remand from the Supreme
Court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that summary judgment in the
employer's favor was appropriate because the plaintiff could not establish the third factor
of the McDonnell Douglas test-that his job performance was satisfactory. O'Connor v.
Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718, 719-20 (4th Cir. 1996). Initially, the Fourth
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plaintiffs whose attorneys are working on a contingency fee, it is
cold comfort that original errors in applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework may eventually be corrected at the appellate
level.
III. EXPLORING WHETHER MCDONNELL DOUGLAS Is SUPPORTED
BY COMMON METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

As discussed throughout this Article, it is not clear whether
the McDonnell Douglas standard actually operates as the prima
facie case for discrimination or only as an evidentiary
framework.13 7 If the test spells out the elements of a cause of
action for discrimination,138 we should be satisfied either that the
test has a satisfactory statutory basis or that there is a principled
reason for such a departure.13 9 Parts III.A and III.B explore
whether the test is supported by the text, legislative history or
underlying purposes of Title VII, and conclude that it is not.
Part III.C explores whether a common law methodology explains
the burden-shifting framework and likewise concludes that such
a justification is lacking. If, on the other hand, the standard is
merely evidentiary, Part III.D concludes that the test still lacks a
sufficient tie to the statute to justify its continued use.
Circuit affirmed summary judgment despite the fact that the employer's evidence
regarding the plaintiffs performance was disputed. See O'Connor,56 F.3d at 547.
137.
There is no question that the Supreme Court has claimed that the test is merely
an evidentiary framework. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510
(2002) ("The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement."); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 986 (1988) ("We have cautioned that [the McDonnell Douglas framework is] meant
only to aid courts and litigants in arranging the presentation of evidence.. . ."). However,
as discussed in Part IV of this Article, recent changes in the way in which courts apply
the test makes this assertion less convincing. See infra Part IV.
138.
For a description of the differences between the standard as a prima facie case
and as an evidentiary tool, see Gold, supra note 92, at 188-89, which posits that the term
"prima facie case" can refer to both "the elements of a claim" and "the evidence that
proves a claim."
139.
One area in which a departure from a statutory basis is generally accepted is
antitrust. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, "Is There a Text in this
Class?" The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
619, 621-24 (2005) (discussing how the typical textualist "zeal" is lacking in antitrust
statutory construction). However, construction of Title VII disparate treatment claims
should differ markedly from construction of the Sherman Act because the potential
breadth and ambiguity of the latter statute's operative language renders literal
application of the statutory text impossible and provides little guidance on how to apply
the statute to complex economic situations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
Additionally, some believe that "increased consensus and sophistication in the economic
analysis of antitrust" has and should alter the original tenets of the field. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 229 (1999).
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Wading into the thicket of the varied and conflicting
methods of statutory construction is, at first blush, a daunting
task. However, concerns about the scope of such a task can be
diminished by beginning with two basic caveats. First, this
Article is not attempting to make any descriptive, evaluative, or
normative claim about any particular statutory construction
methodology over another. Such an analysis is unnecessary given
the thesis of this Article-that McDonnell Douglas does not
evidence proper consideration of any of these methods of
statutory construction. The solution offered to correct the
existing problem is consistent with all of the discussed
methodologies, thus requiring no choice between them.
Second, the Article is not intending to suggest that the
methodologies can be neatly pressed into the general categories
used in this section. There is much debate within the academic
community about where the delineations between the methods of
statutory construction lie, 4 ° and this Article is not intended to
enter that fray. Rather, the goal of this section is to describe the
contours of each statutory construction method in a way that is
conducive to exploring those methods in conjunction with Title
VII.
With these caveats in mind, it is also important to stress
that despite the conflicting beliefs about what tools courts should
use in construing statutes, there are points of agreement about
proper statutory interpretation. One such point of agreement is
140.
See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 78 (2006) (noting that the dividing line between textualism and
purposivism is not "cut-and-dried"); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV.
347, 355-56 (2005) (discussing the acknowledgement by textualists of the relevance of
purpose in statutory interpretation); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of
Statutory Interpretation,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 592-93 (1988) (commenting that a plain
meaning analysis must take into account both the internal context of the statute as well
as the external context).
Further, in a descriptive sense, it is not clear whether such delineations even
exist. Popkin describes the process of statutory construction as "moving back and forth
betweens words and other indicia of meaning without preconceived notions about whether
the words are clear." Id. at 594. William Eskridge and Philip Frickey similarly describe
the process as "polycentric" and not "linear and purely deductive." William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321, 348 (1990). Indeed they suggest that "an interpreter will look at a broad range of
evidence-text, historical evidence, and the text's evolution-and thus form a preliminary
view of the statute." Id. at 352. This view would then be refined by political and other
considerations. Id. at 347. They also suggest that different methods should be accorded
different weights in the consideration process, with the text enjoying primacy. Id. at 35354. Given both time and space limitations, it would be impossible to discuss all of the
possible distinctions that may be made in various statutory construction theories, and
thus, it becomes necessary to make choices about how to slice the statutory construction
pie. Although recognizing that others may slice this pie differently, my goal is to discuss
the four major methodologies and apply them to the problem at hand.
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that courts should use some method or combination of accepted
methods in construing statutory language.14 ' Again, there is
disagreement about what the methodology should consist of, but
there is general agreement that it is improper for courts to
simply create elements of a statutory cause of action without
reference to some recognized tool.'42
A second point of agreement in the statutory construction
literature is that the words used in a statute matter.'43 This is not
to suggest that commentators and judges agree about what tools
should be used to interpret statutory words, only that statutory
construction involves some interaction between the court and the
words in the statute.'44 With these general propositions in mind,
let's begin by exploring the accepted tools that courts use in
construing statutes.
A. A Plain Meaning Analysis of the Framework
One of the primary methods of statutory interpretation is the
plain meaning approach.' While the term "plain meaning" exudes
a sense of simplicity, such an assumption would be misplaced
because the exact contours of plain meaning interpretation are

141.
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role
of United States Federal Courts in Interpretingthe Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 14-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(criticizing various theories of statutory interpretation and expressing concern about the
lack of an "intelligible theory"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140, at 353-54 ("In
formulating and testing her understanding of [a] statute, the interpreter will [examine
various interpretation methods], evaluating and comparing different considerations
represented by each source of argumentation."); John F. Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388-89 (2003) (discussing the long-standing role of the
.absurdity doctrine" in various schemes of statutory interpretation).
142.
See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One
Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV.
887, 899 (1987) (contrasting the judicial role in statutory construction with that in the
application of common law).
143.
See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140, at 353-54 (noting that the
statute's text provides the source of the '[miost [cloncrete [i]nquiry" in statutory
interpretation); Manning, supra note 141, at 2388 (stating that the Court has long looked
to the statutory text, deviating only when the application would create "absurd" results);
Nelson, supra note 140, at 348 ("[N]o 'textualist' favors isolating statutory language from
its surrounding context, and no critic of textualism believes that statutory text is
unimportant." (footnote omitted)); Popkin, supra note 140, at 591-98 (observing that
courts generally assign "primary significance" to the text of statutes).
144.
See Popkin, supra note 140, at 594 ("The interpretive process is almost
certainly.., one of moving back and forth between words and other indicia of
meaning. ... ").
145.
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principleand Why It Matters:
Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning
Approach, 79 TuL. L. REV. 955, 971-72 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's application
of the plain meaning rule).
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debated.' However, it is safe to say that under a plain meaning
approach, the jurist's goal is to explicate the meaning of the
itself'.147
statutory text, typically by reference to the statutory text
Recognizing that clear lines of demarcation do not exist between
plain meaning approaches to statutory construction and other
approaches, for purposes of this Article, plain meaning will refer to
methods of construction that consider only the language of the
statute, without seeking guidance from the statute's purpose,
legislative history, or common law considerations.
This definition of plain meaning is, therefore, intended to focus
on the textualist aspects of this doctrine.'49 As textualism is the
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that the differences among
146.
methods of statutory construction are ambiguous and debated).
147.
See, e.g., Craig, supra note 145, at 971-72 ("[T]he rule operates... as a
presumption, limiting the arguments available to promote any meaning other than the
statute's plain meaning."). Such a definition is admittedly restrictive, because it does not
encompass a broader approach to plain meaning that would recognize that there is often a
difference between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning, which, as Stanley Fish
describes, is the difference "between the meaning an utterance has by virtue of the lexical
items and syntactic structures that make it up, and the meaning a speaker may have
intended but not achieved." Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 629, 629 (2005). However, adopting a broader definition of plain meaning is not
helpful for purposes of this Article. Such an articulation necessarily encompasses
elements of intentionalism and purposivism; it is easier, however, to consider these
elements separately in trying to determine whether any of these tools support the threepart burden-shifting framework.
But see Manning, supra note 140, at 78 ("Properly understood, textualism is not
148.
and could not be defined either by a strict preference for enacted text over unenacted
context, or by a wholesale rejection of the utility of purpose."); Nelson, supra note 140, at
355 (noting that textualism may not be so narrowly defined and suggesting that
consideration of the purpose behind a statute is countenanced by the textualist approach).
Nelson further suggests that textualists may be just as concerned about the intent of the
legislators as intentionalists, but believe that legislative history is more likely to provide
an inaccurate picture of the collective legislature's intent. Id. at 362-63.
149.
See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L.
REV. 20, 23 (1988) (describing the basis of textualism as "a positivist claim that only the
language actually adopted by the legislature is law"); Nelson, supra note 140, at 347-48
(noting that textualists do not support the severance of text from its context). For the sake
of full discussion, the Author notes that the textualist approach, as with other approaches
to statutory construction, has its critics. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's
New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative
State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 762 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court's continued
use of "plain meaning" has caused lower courts to improperly adopt an increasingly
stringent form of the "plain meaning" rule). Some commentators believe that sole reliance
on statutory language may "wrench[] a word completely out of context" and that
textualism produces cramped interpretations of legislation. Popkin, supra note 140, at
592; see also Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 899 (1982) ("[Tlhe limitations
of language mean that.., the words of a statute may not fully capture congressional
meaning."). Others criticize textualism's assumption that if a statute is interpreted too
narrowly that Congress will correct the problem. Id. at 905 (arguing that textualism
"assumes that Congress will continually reinterpret all legislation and will respond
effectively to new problems as they arise" and noting that it is an impossible task for
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most restricted method of plain meaning construction, it serves as a
good starting point for our analysis of Title VII, and the starting
point for the textualist approach is the language of the statute
itself."'
The operative antidiscrimination provision of Title VII provides
as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 151
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court cited this operative language,
but did not make any attempt to explain how this language in any
way related to the three-part test that it created.5 2 From a
textualist perspective, the framework simply has no support in the
language of the statute.'53 Four key features of McDonnell Douglas
deserve further discussion from a textualist perspective.
1. The Framework Does Not Provide Plaintiffs with Adequate
Protection.To successfully raise a prima facie case of discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must establish:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position

Congress to anticipate all issues that will be raised under a statute). Judge Posner
criticizes the descriptive power of the term "textualism" and other plain meaning
approaches. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-Inthe Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 807-08 (1983) ("Offered as a description of what judges
do, the proposition is false. The judge rarely starts his inquiry with the words of the
statute, and often, if the truth be told, he does not look at the words at all.").
150.
The major critique of textualism in the context of civil rights legislation is that
Congress has routinely amended statutes solely to fix what Congress believes to be
cramped readings of the statutes. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
113-14 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (providing examples of Congress repudiating the
Court's narrow reading of statutes in the civil rights context).
151.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
152.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 n.4 (1973) (quoting
§ 2000e-2(a)).
153.
It is possible that the Supreme Court engaged in an analysis of the connections
between the statute and the test and failed to explicitly provide this analysis within the
opinion itself. However, given the ways in which the test appears to deviate from the
statute and the lack of explanation for both the deviations and the need for a test, a
reasonable conclusion is that the Court at least failed to provide proper consideration of
the statutory text.

2006]

WITHOUT A STATUTORY BASIS

767

remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.'
Only one of these four factors is supported by the statutory
language and all three other factors can, in some cases, exclude
legitimate claims of discrimination that should be cognizable
under Title VII."'
The requirement that an applicant be qualified for the job
was initially quite problematic for Title VII litigants.
Originally, some courts required litigants to establish that they
met both the subjective and the objective qualifications for a job
in order to establish a prima facie case."' It was often difficult for
plaintiffs to prove subjective criteria, like good interviewing and
communication skills, especially when the evaluation of these
skills was being performed by the alleged discriminator.'
Before the courts articulated that the plaintiff only needs to
prove objective qualifications for the job, the claims of individuals
were dismissed for failure to fit within the McDonnell Douglas
mold." 9 However, despite the growing body of case law finding
that plaintiff must only demonstrate that he or she met the
objective qualifications for the job, defendants continue to argue
about this factor.'6 °
Title VII imposes no requirement that only qualified
individuals can be discriminated against. 6 ' Indeed, individuals
who have direct evidence of discrimination are not required to
prove that they were qualified for a position before establishing

154.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
155.
In this section, the discussion of the McDonnell Douglas test suggests that the
courts are actually using the factors of the test as elements of a cause of action under the
antidiscrimination statutes. In Part IV, infra, the Article will discuss the test's lack of a
statutory basis if the test is viewed as merely an evidentiary standard.
156.
See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454, 463-64 (4th Cir.
1983) (finding that an applicant was not qualified for a sales job even though he had
graduated from high school, had completed six months of college, and had worked as a
truck driver for the defendant for four years).
157.
See, e.g., id. at 465 (finding that plaintiff did not established a prima facie case
absent evidence "that he was more qualified than anyone who was given a sales job
between 1970 and 1976").
158.
See Baldwin v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1573, 1581 (M.D.
Ga. 1988) (noting that "some subjectivity is unavoidable in making a decision as to who
will be a good [employee]").
159.
See Canty v. Olivarez, 452 F. Supp. 762, 770 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (stating that the
plaintiff did not show a pretext for sexual discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
standard because the application process used by the employer was cancelled).
160.
Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768-69 (11th Cir. 2005)
(dismissing defendant's argument that the plaintiff employee was unqualified because "he
lacked the leadership style [the defendant] preferred").
161.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
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discrimination. 6 ' The easiest example demonstrating a problem
with the qualifications requirement is a situation where the
employer has a list of objective qualifications for a position that
are normally used to evaluate candidates, but does not use them
in making the decision related to the plaintiff, instead relying on
a discriminatory reason. In this situation, it makes no difference
whether the individual was qualified for the job. The individual
was discriminated against based on a protected trait because
equal consideration for the position was not given."'
Further, in some cases, requiring a plaintiff to prove
qualifications for a job is unnecessary and unrelated to the
question of whether discrimination occurred. A common example
of such a situation is one in which the employer terminates an
individual based on economic reasons, perhaps asserting that it
no longer needs as many employees performing plaintiffs task.
In this type of case, the employer has implicitly demonstrated
that the plaintiff was qualified for the position by retaining the
individual until economic circumstances changed. Yet, in cases of
circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell Douglas test encourages
defendants to retrospectively challenge plaintiffs qualifications
solely for the purposes of litigation.16 4
To provide a more defendant-friendly hypothetical, consider
a common scenario where an employer receives hundreds of
applications for one available position. Many of the applicants
possess the requisite minimum qualifications; however, the
employer chooses a person who has more than the minimum
qualifications.'65 While the plaintiffs qualifications, in contrast
162.
See Fadhl v. City & County of S.F., 741 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1984),
overruled by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
163.
In these situations, courts may not require plaintiffs to prove qualifications for
the job. Id. (expounding that plaintiffs subject to discrimination during hiring "need not
prove that he or she was qualified to fill the position sought in order to obtain some
relief"). Even though reformulating the McDonnell Douglas test is less problematic than
denying the plaintiffs claim based on failure to prove a prima facie case, it still requires
the plaintiff to come forward with additional evidence and convince the court that the
change in the framework is warranted. Such evidence may be difficult to establish,
especially if the employer placed a person in the position who met the objective
qualifications of the job or if the plaintiffs evidence of discriminatory animus on the part
of the decisionmaker is not related to the decision at issue. It should be noted that this
argument also may not be successful. See, e.g., Stevo v. CSZ Transp., Inc., No. 97-3974,
1998 WL 516788, at *4 (7th Cir. July 27, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (finding that
even if qualifications had been considered, applicant would not have been hired).
164.
See, e.g., Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the City's arguments that it dismissed the plaintiff due to a lack of
interpersonal skills and that it did not mention this shortcoming in the plaintiffs
performance evaluation because it would lower his self esteem).
165.
See Kingsley R. Browne, StatisticalProof of Discrimination:Beyond "Damned
Lies," 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 513 n.121 (1993) (noting that minimally-qualified minorities
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with the hired individual's qualifications, will likely be relevant
to the case, the fact that the plaintiff met the minimal
qualifications does not suggest that discrimination has occurred.
In cases like those discussed in this section, McDonnell Douglas
requires the plaintiff to prove too much or too little and distracts
the courts and litigants from the actual question at hand.'66
Similar problems have arisen under the prong of the test
that requires a plaintiff to prove that, after he was rejected for a
job, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.'67
This prong was fashioned from the specific facts of the McDonnell
Douglas case and has undergone extensive revision through
litigation over the past 30 years.168 This factor proved especially
problematic in the reduction-in-force context, where it is possible
for someone to be selected for termination based on a protected
trait, yet not be replaced by other workers. 9
Some courts have replaced this fourth factor with a more
general requirement that the plaintiff produce evidence that the
"adverse employment action gave rise to an inference of
discrimination.', 7 It is difficult to determine how the broadening
of this fourth prong provides the court with any additional aid in

should be required to show more than just rejection because "rejection of one qualified
applicant in favor of another raises no inference of discrimination").
166.
See, e.g., Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221, 1224 (10th Cir.
2003) (Hartz, J., writing separately) (recognizing that "the McDonnell Douglas framework
only creates confusion and distracts" the courts, which focus on the individual parts of
McDonnell Douglas when they should be focusing on the main issue-namely "whether
the evidence supports a finding of unlawful discrimination").
167.
See, e.g., Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting it makes little sense to require fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test
in reduction in force cases); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 560 (10th Cir.
1996) (explaining that the fourth factor must be applied flexibly in reduction in force
cases); Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that in reduction in force cases the McDonnell Douglas test has been modified
because the employer does not replace the discharged employee).
168.
See, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys. Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 356 (3d Cir. 1999)
(explaining how courts eventually determined that plaintiffs are not required to prove
they were replaced by individuals outside the protected class as part of their prima facie
case while noting that in many prior cases it appeared this was an element); Steward v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (noting that plaintiff need
not prove that he was replaced by a person outside of his protected class, but rather must
only show that employees outside that class received more favorable treatment).
169.
See Christina A. Smith, Note, The Road to Retirement-Paved with Good
Intentions but Dotted with Potholes of Untold Liability:Erisa Section 510, Mixed Motives
and Title VII, 81 MINN. L. REV. 735, 757 n.129 (1997) (citing JOEL W. FRIEDMAN &
GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 927-28 (3d ed. 1993)).
170.
Jowers v. Lakeside Family & Children's Servs., No. 03 Civ. 8730 (LMS), 2005
WL 3134019, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005).
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determining whether discrimination occurred or why the court's
consideration of evidence of discrimination should be divided
between the prima facie case and the third stage of the test
following the employer's
articulation
of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
One response to these criticisms is to cite the mantra that
the factors of McDonnell Douglas are flexible and should change
with the facts of the case. 7 ' This retort is not fair to either party
in a discrimination case, especially the plaintiff.'72 Even while the
Court has noted that the McDonnell Douglas framework is
flexible, it has also indicated that it is a "'legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption,' ' 73 and while it is possible for problems
with the test to be overcome by asking the court to recraft the
test in light of the facts of the particular case before it, courts are
reluctant to veer from the preset McDonnell Douglas course. "4
It also should be recognized that some litigants are only
afforded this "flexibility" if they have counsel who is willing to
undertake the risk and expense of litigating a claim to the
Supreme Court. For example, in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., the Court addressed the question of whether a
prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA required the
plaintiff to prove that he was replaced by someone outside of the
protected class.175 Before the Supreme Court's reversal, both the
district court and the court of appeals held the plaintiff to a
somewhat rigid prima facie case, with the district court
dismissing the case at summary judgment and the appeals court
affirming that dismissal.1 76 Given the expense of litigating a case
to the Supreme Court, many plaintiffs may choose to settle their
claims, rather than undertake the time and expense of extensive
appellate litigation. 77 Additionally, it should be remembered that
the parties tailor their fact gathering during the discovery
process to the standard that the court will use during summary

171.
See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 357.
172.
See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 926-27 ("Although the McDonnell Douglas Court
explicitly recognized that its formulation of prima facie proof would need to be modified
for other situations, lower courts have often disagreed about what evidence constitutes a
prima facie case in other contexts." (footnote omitted)).
173.
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (quoting Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981)).
174.
See sources cited supra notes 168, 172.
175.
O'Connor,517 U.S. at 311-12.
176.
Id. at 309-10.
177.
See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 941 n.120 (noting that "judges' views about the
potential merits of a case are likely to shape settlement decisions at pretrial settlement
conferences").
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judgment and trial.'7 8 A standard that changes' after discovery
closes does not allow the parties to fully effectuate their discovery
rights.
2. At Times, the Framework Improperly Requires
Defendants to Articulate a Reason for Their Conduct. While many
of the problems with the prima facie case disadvantage plaintiffs,
they can also disadvantage defendants by raising an inference of
discrimination, where none should exist.'79 As discussed earlier,
once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, an inference of
discrimination arises and the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
conduct."18
However, two rather simple scenarios demonstrate how
McDonnell Douglas is at times overinclusive when trying to
ferret out discrimination. First, assume that Margaret, a white
woman, applied for a secretarial job with a company. She met the
minimum, objective qualifications for the job, but was not hired
for the position. Instead, the company hired Bob, a white man for
the position. Bob's qualifications for the position were better than
Margaret's. Second, consider the situation discussed in the
previous section, where an employer receives one hundred
applications for every position. Even though many of the
applicants possess the requisite minimum qualifications, the
employer chooses a person who has more than the minimum
qualifications.'
Under these circumstances, plaintiff would have met the
prima facie case for establishing discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas; but under this set of facts, it is not clear whether an
inference of discrimination should arise. However, McDonnell
Douglas automatically assumes that such an inference is created
and requires the parties to undertake the second and third steps

178.
See id. at 941-43 (discussing the wide use of summary judgment and the low
success rates in various discrimination claims).
179.
See, e.g., Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that proof of an employer's intent to discriminate "may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
180.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-74. Typically, defendants will offer a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their conduct and also offer evidence to attack
the plaintiffs prima facie case. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371,
1375 (11th Cir. 1996) (reviewing the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge
proffered by the employer, including allegations the employee lacked overall competence).
181.
See Browne, supra note 165, at 513 n.121 ("[T]he mere rejection of a minimally
qualified minority should not be enough to establish a prima facie case, since rejection of
one qualified applicant in favor of another raises no inference of discrimination.").
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of the inquiry." 2 Although McDonnell Douglas attempts to rid the
courts
of deciding
cases
when
the
most
common
nondiscriminatory reasons are given for employment decisionsunqualified candidate or position unavailability, 3 there are
clearly nondiscriminatory and common reasons for employment
decisions that do not fit clearly within the prima facie case.
Further, under the familiar common law standard, absent a
contrary employment contract or state law, an employer was
allowed to take an employment action against a plaintiff for a
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason.8 4 There is nothing
within the text of Title VII that suggests that it was designed to
take away the employer's ability to act for no reason; however,
this is essentially what the McDonnell Douglas framework
does.8 5 If an employer does not articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, the inference of
discrimination created by plaintiffs prima facie case is
unrebutted"' While there may be policy reasons for requiring
employers to recite the reasons for an employment action, the
operative language of Title VII does not mandate such a course."'

182.
Id. at 513-14 & nn.121-22.
183.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("By [establishing a prima facie case], Hicks 'eliminat[ed] the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons' for demotion and firing: that he was unqualified for the
position or that the position was no longer available." (alteration in original) (quoting Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981))).
184.
See Miller v. Auto. Club of N.M., Inc., 420 F.3d 1098, 1128 (10th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that, under New Mexico common law, employment contracts are presumed to
be terminable at will by either party); Layton v. MMM Design Group, 32 F. App'x 677,
679-80 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that according to Virginia's at-will employment doctrine,
an employer may terminate an employee any time for any reason).
185.
See Pepe v. Rival Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 349, 368 (D.N.J. 1999) ("The
antidiscrimination statutes are designed to protect against discrimination, not to displace
employers' discretion in making employment decisions."). But see Perry v. Woodward, 199
F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Although the general rule that an employer can
discharge an at-will employee for any reason or no reason is still valid, an employer can
no longer terminate an at-will employment relationship for racially discriminatory
reason.").
186.
See Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 1988).
187.
Admittedly, this problem with the McDonnell Douglas standard does not receive
much attention, because it has few practical consequences in actual litigation. Whether
required by the standard or not, most employers would provide a reason for their
employment decision as a matter of course in defending against the plaintiffs claims. This
is demonstrated by employer's conduct prior to the articulation of McDonnell Douglas
standard. Huff v. N. D. Cass Co. of Ala., 468 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that the
defendant argued the plaintiffs termination was due to his poor performance); Anderson
v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., No. 6580, 1971 WL 150, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 23,
1971) (suggesting the plaintiff was fired because she could not get along with coworkers),
affd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972); Forte v. S.S. Kresge Co., No. 2370, 1971 WL 209, at *1
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 1971) (suggesting that the plaintiff was terminated for being
discourteous to the store manager's wife), affd, 1972 WL 2592 (4th Cir. Feb. 14, 1972).
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3. The Framework Creates a False Dichotomy Between
Direct and Circumstantial Evidence. In addition to its
substantive flaws, the McDonnell Douglas test also created a
false dichotomy between circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence that is not supported by the statute's language.'8 8 There
is nothing within Title VII that suggests that plaintiffs alleging
discrimination through the use of circumstantial evidence should
be treated any differently than plaintiffs who are fortunate
enough to be able to produce direct evidence of discrimination.8 9
Yet, at least with respect to single motive discrimination claims,
this dichotomy continues in many circuits.'9 ° Such a dichotomy is
especially puzzling because it conflicts with the evidentiary
principle that direct and circumstantial evidence should be given
equal weight by a jury. 9 '
4. The Framework Does Not Appear to Have Addressed an
Existing Problem. One suggestion in support of the framework
could be that the term "discrimination" is inherently ambiguous
and that the Supreme Court needed to provide a test to ensure a
workable standard for the lower courts. This argument is
unconvincing for several reasons. First, the operative statutory
192
language does not just state that it is unlawful to discriminate.
Instead, it prohibits employers from failing to hire, discharging,
or discriminating against a person with respect to compensation
or other terms or privileges of employment.
While it may be difficult to interpret some portions of this
operative language, such as when discrimination happens in the
"privileges" of employment or whether disparate impact results
in discrimination,' 94 the Court was not faced with this type of

188.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Courts will ... be required to make the often subtle and difficult distinction
between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstantial' evidence.").
189.
Cf Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 744-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating
that direct and circumstantial evidence are equally persuasive in proving discrimination
and that all Title VII requires is proof that "discrimination was a motivating factor in the
employment decision").
190.
See id. at 743-45 (observing pervasive use of differing standards for direct and
circumstantial evidence); cf Corbett, supra note 9, at 1568 n.109 (questioning the
viability of the McDonnell Douglas standard after Congress codified the "motivating
factor standard" in the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
191.
See United States v. Curry, 187 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1999); Elliott v. Thomas,
937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991) (agreeing that "there is no principled difference between
direct and circumstantial evidence").
192.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (providing specific prohibited practices rather
than a general statement that discrimination is prohibited).
193.
Id.
194.
See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (recognizing
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question. Mr. Green brought a failure to hire case.195 The
statutory language clearly tells us that if there is evidence that
an employer failed to hire an individual because of his race, the
individual can prevail under Title VIL' 96
Secondarily, it might be suggested that the lower courts
were confused about what evidence would support such a claim.
The district court did not appear to have any such problem. It
articulated a sensible explanation of the key factual inquiries:
"(1) whether the plaintiffs misconduct is sufficient to justify
defendant's refusal to rehire, and (2) whether the 'stall in' and
the 'lock in' are the real reasons for defendant's refusal to rehire
the plaintiff."9 7 Furthermore, although there are few reported
disparate treatment cases pre-dating McDonnell Douglas, there
does not appear to be confusion within these courts.19 Neither
the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit expressed that it was
attempting to remedy such confusion.9
As these problems demonstrate, the McDonnell Douglas
standard is not supported by the operative language of Title VII,
and indeed, conflicts with the statute in many important
respects .2' Therefore, it is difficult to justify the framework
under a plain meaning or textualist methodology."'

that disparate impact claims were cognizable under Title VII).
195.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 782, 797 (1973).
196.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
197.
Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Mo. 1970), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
198.
See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1972)
(stating that the district court correctly held that the plaintiff had not met his burden of
proving discrimination); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., No. 6580, 1971 WYL
150, at *1-3 (W.D. Ky. June 23, 1971) (finding that the female plaintiff had been
discriminated against based on her race when she was terminated because her coworkers,
who were motivated by racial animus, complained about her performance), affd, 464 F.2d
723 (6th Cir. 1972).
199.
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343-44 (8th Cir. 1972)
(addressing the much broader question of whether subjective hiring practices themselves
are inherently discriminatory), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme Court opinion
rejects the idea that such practices necessarily raise a discriminatory inference, and its
opinion does not appear to be directed specifically toward such practices. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 803-04.
200.
See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745-46 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Magnuson, J., concurring) (illustrating inconsistencies between Title VII and the
McDonnell Douglas framework).
201.
The Supreme Court failed to provide any analysis connecting the framework
with the statute, making it difficult to determine the Court's intended result in crafting
the test. Eddie Kirtley, Comment, Where's Einstein When You Need Him? Assessing the
Role of Relative Qualificationsin a Plaintiffs Case of Failure-to-PromoteUnder Title VII,
60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 390 n.160 (2006) (citing Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort;
Vive Le Roi!: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the
Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed
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Applying Intentionalistor PurposivistFrameworks to the
McDonnell Douglas Standard

Several methods of statutory construction allow courts to
consider the intention underlying a statute when interpreting
that statute.2 ' Leaving aside questions about when intent should
come into play in any statutory construction analysis, the
difficulties inherent in determining what intent the court is
attempting to discover,2 °2 and what sources are appropriate
Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 90-92 (2003)) (stating that the Supreme Court did
not address why it came up with the framework it created or why it ignored the classic
tort burden of proof standard and created a burden-shifting test). There is no indication
that the Court was attempting to intentionally modify the statute in the aforementioned
ways. Rather, it appears that the Court merely failed to anticipate the impact of the
decision. Additionally, subsequent "clarification" of the McDonnell Douglas framework
has amplified some of the problems with the framework. See Corbett, supra note 9, at
1558 (discussing the sharp criticism of applying McDonnell Douglas due to the difficulty
of classifying and analyzing cases). Compare St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
511 (1993) (stating that a finding that reasons given for termination are false permits a
finding that there was in fact discrimination), with St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 528
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that a finding that reasons given for termination are false
compels a finding of discrimination). It is unlikely that these subsequent clarifications
were fully anticipated by the original court.
202.
The term "intentionalist" may be used to describe several different methods of
statutory construction that allow the use of legislative history and other signals of intent,
but these methods may differ significantly. Under one intentionalist method of statutory
construction, if a statute is ambiguous, the Court should look to the legislative history of
the statute and give the language the meaning intended by Congress. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Essay, Textualism and the Futureof the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,
366-68 (1994). Other intentionalists countenance the use of legislative and other
materials to determine the plain meaning of the language in the first place. See Eskridge
& Frickey, supra note 140, at 325-26 (explaining that the courts are agents of the
legislature and should use congressional intent as "the touchstone for statutory
interpretation"). In this Article, the term "intentionalism" refers broadly to those methods
of statutory construction that countenance the use of some method of legislative intent.
203.
Inherent difficulties exist in ascertaining the actual intent of the legislature. See
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's
Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 21-23
(1996) ("Determining legislative intent is frequently a difficult and creative enterprise.")
One of these inherent difficulties is in determining what intent is being discerned. For
example, two approaches to determining statutory intent advocate that the court look
back to the time when the statute was enacted. One method, "imaginative
reconstruction," which was proposed by Judge Richard Posner, requires a judge to try to
put himself in the position of the legislature enacting the legislation and determine how
that legislature would apply the statutory text. Posner, supra note 149, at 817. The
imaginative reconstruction method suggests that the judge look at "the language and
apparent purpose of the statute, its background and structure, its legislative
history[, ... related statutes," the values at the time the statute was enacted, and "any
sign of legislative intent regarding the freedom with which he should exercise his
interpretive function." Id. at 818. Another similar methodology coined as "original
meaning" by Judge Easterbrook asks courts to determine what knowledgeable users of
the words, at the time that the statute passed, would have thought about the meaning of
the words. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARv. J.L. & SOC. POL. 59, 61 (1988).
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indicators of legislative intent,2 "4 this section merely seeks to
determine whether Congress directed the creation of the
McDonnell Douglas test or, at least, to determine whether the
test is consistent with original legislative intention.
Before addressing Title VII's legislative history, it is
important to note academic and judicial critiques of
intentionalism. This discussion is important because the
criticisms of intentionalism play out starkly in the context of
Title VII, perhaps more so than in other statutory contexts.
The concerns with intentionalism have been widely
discussed in the literature. One critique is that an individual
legislator's expressions of intent may not reflect the collective
will of the legislature; in other words, individual legislators can
change the intent of the statute through manipulative use of
legislative history.2 "5 Further, there is concern that intentionalist
judges selectively cull through legislative history for signals
about intention that support the judge's reading of the statute,
while ignoring other relevant portions of the legislative history." 6
Additionally, public choice jurisprudence cautions that statutes
are carefully crafted outcomes created after compromises
between competing political interests and that relying too much
on legislative history may unduly upset the intended outcomes,
which can be expressed only through the actual language of the
statutory provisions themselves.2 °7
These concerns may be truer when interpreting the
operative language of Title VII, even more so than in other
contexts. As one court noted, "[tihe legislative history of Title VII
has virtually been declared judicially incomprehensible." 8 The
debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which also included civil
rights protections in the areas of public accommodations and
Eskridge and Frickey question whether a judge is ever actually capable of
ascertaining the intent of individuals in a different time period, given the bias of the judge
as historian. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140, at 330 (discussing how different
interpretations can come from the same facts, depending on the "current context of the
judicial interpreter"). This may be especially true in the case of civil rights litigation,
where societal norms and expectations have changed dramatically over the last 100 years.
204.
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140, at 326-27 (discussing the use of
committee reports and floor statements by bill sponsors to determine the "conventional
intent" of the legislature).
205.
Nelson, supra note 140, at 362-63 (describing Justice Scalia's concern that
legislators might "salt the CongressionalRecord with misleading statements that further
their own special agendas" if courts find the entire legislature's intent in such isolated
statements).
206. Id. at 363.
207.
Id. at 370-71.
208.
Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1138 n.7 (5th Cir.
1971).
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voting, has been coined "The Longest Debate."'0 9 Debate lasted
nine days on the floor of the House of Representatives.2 10 Behindthe-scenes maneuvering in the Senate lasted throughout 13
weeks of filibustering by the bill's opponents, which represented
the longest filibuster in the history of the Senate. " ' As one
commentator indicates:
The 1964 civil rights Senate debate lasted over eighty
days and took up some seven thousand pages in the
Congressional Record. Well over ten million words were
devoted to the subject by members of the upper house. In
addition, the debate produced the longest filibuster in
Senate history, as well as the first successful invocation
of cloture in many years.212
One public choice criticism of legislative history is that only
the words of the statute can be relied on because the legislative
history itself may reveal only the tumult of the legislative process
and not the final result intended to be reached by the
legislators.2 13 Whether this criticism is valid in the abstract is not
at issue here, but the Civil Rights Act of 1964's legislative history
is one that is certainly clouded by the political maneuvering
happening at the time.21 " The bill was passed in the wake of the
assassination of John F. Kennedy21 5 and was deftly maneuvered
through the political process in a manner designed to thwart
some Southern legislators' opposition to the bill. 16
Indeed, opponents of the bill described the way it was
brought before the House of Representatives as not allowing
committee members "to ask questions, have an explanation of the
bill, discuss it, consider its provisions, and offer amendments.""7
209.
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
210.
Id. at 123.
211.
Id. at 193. For a discussion of the filibuster and the Senators' attempts to move
the bill, see generally id. at 124-93.
212.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS
PART II 1089 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
213.
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice,
74 VA. L. REV. 423, 427-29 (1988).
214.
See generally WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 209, at 141-93 (describing the
Senate filibuster and the underlying manipulation by both Republicans and Democrats
before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
215.
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 212, at 1018 (reporting that five days after President
Kennedy's death, in a memorial address to Congress, newly-sworn President Lyndon
Johnson said, "'No memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President
Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he
fought so long").
216.
See id. at 1020.
217.
110 CONG. REC. 1530, 1531 (1964) (statement of Sen. Richard Russell), reprinted
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The same concerns were echoed in the Senate debate, where Sen.
Richard Russell indicated: "The bill has never been upon the
usual legislative highways at any point in its career. It is
untouched by any of the ordinary legislative processes." 18 Sen.
Russell further opined that the House Judiciary Committee's
consideration of the civil rights bill was "summarily junked" and
"[i]n its place was substituted a bill drafted by the Office of the
Attorney General in conjunction with certain key leaders of the
movement."219
Further, it has been suggested that many amendments to
the legislation, including the addition of gender as a protected
class, were inserted into the legislation by Southern politicians to
ensure that the legislation would not garner enough votes in the
House of Representatives."' However, these amendments were
also championed by others, such as a bloc of female legislators,
who actually supported the amendments.22 '
Even setting these caveats regarding legislative history
aside, it is still difficult to discern anything within the legislative
history of Title VII that clearly supports the McDonnell Douglas
standard. 2 Indeed, given the magnitude of the changes wrought
by the bill, a large portion of the discussion about the bill in both
the House and the Senate focused on whether the bill, as a
whole, should be passed.223 There is little discussion about the

in SCHWARTZ, supra note 212, at 1116.

218.
110 CONG. REC. 4742, 4743 (1964) (statement of Sen. Richard Russell), reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supra note 212, at 1141 (quoting Sen. Richard Russell).
219.
110 CONG. REC. 4742, 4743 (1964) (statement of Sen. Richard Russell), reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supra note 212, at 1142. Sen. Russell continued, "Time and again it was
stated in the debate on the floor of the House, and never at any time denied or questioned,
that the Attorney General's 56-page bill of 10 titles was steamrolled through the
committee without permitting a single member of the committee to ask even one question
about the bill or to offer a single amendment to it." Id.
220.
WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 209, at 116.
221.
See id. at 117 (discussing a coalition of five congresswomen who supported the
amendment).
222.
See generally Judith Olans Brown, Stephen N. Subrin & Phyllis Tropper
Baumann, Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment DiscriminationLaw:
A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1520-21
n.158 (1997) (criticizing the Hicks Court for dismissing previous misreadings of
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny while -"look[ing] neither to legislative history nor to
Title VII for guidance'" in concluding that its "'belated interpretation is the proper one;"
instead, "' [wihen confronting language that explicitly contradicted its position, the Court
swept it aside, not by intellect or reasoned analysis, but mostly by fiat'" (quoting Robert
Brookins, Hicks, Lies and Ideology: The Wages of Sin Are Now Exculpation, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 994 (1995))).
223.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 108-10, 128 (1964), as reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2475-76, 2515 (discussing constitutional and broad economic issues
implicated by Title VII).
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specific provisions of Title VII, beyond the summaries of the
provisions provided by individual legislators.224
Surprisingly, there is little discussion in the legislative
history regarding what Congress intended by Title VI's
operative language that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."225 One legislator even commented on the lack of
discussion regarding this important issue by indicating "[lt]here is
no attempt whatever in any title of the bill to define what is
meant by the offense of discrimination. That definition is
nowhere in the context,226in the intent or in the purpose, or even in
the preface of the bill."
There is also little legislative history regarding how
litigation brought pursuant to Title VII would proceed once it
was initiated in federal court.227 One of the few indicators that we
do have suggests, at least mildly, that the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas is inappropriate.228 During the
Senate's debate of the legislation, Senator Humphrey indicated
that "[tihe suit against the respondent, whether brought by the
Commission or by the complaining party, would proceed in the
usual manner for litigation in the Federal courts .... [The
plaintiff would have the burden of proving that discrimination
had occurred."229 While it is true that the McDonnell Douglas
standard places the ultimate burdens of production and
persuasion on the plaintiff, the three-part burden-shifting
framework cannot be said to describe "the usual manner for
litigation in the Federal courts."2 0
At least one of the intentionalist frameworks of statutory
construction suggests that courts should use legislative history,
along with other tools, to determine whether there is "any sign of

224.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 107-08 (1964), as reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2474-75 (summarizing provisions of Title VII).
225.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
226.
110 CONG. REc. 4746, 4746 (1964) (statement of Sen. Richard Russell), reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supra note 212, at 1148.
227.
See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 107-08 (1964), as reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2474-75 (providing little guidance regarding the procedure for litigating Title VII
claims).
228.
See 110 CONG. REC. 6548, 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey), reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supranote 212, at 1228.
229.
Id.
230.
Id.
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legislative intent regarding the freedom with which [the judge]
should exercise his interpretive function."23' In other words, the
legislative history itself can grant courts greater power in
interpreting statutory terms. There is one passage in Title VII's
legislative history, which arguably could support the position
that Congress granted the courts explicit permission to create the
McDonnell Douglas framework.232 When discussing amendments
to Title VII, one of the senators explained, "[a] substantial
number of committee members ... preferred that the ultimate
determination of discrimination rest with the Federal
judiciary." 33
However, reading this sentence to provide a broad grant of
statutory construction leeway would be to misconstrue the
context of the sentence within a broader discussion. This
sentence merely expresses the conclusion that the legislature
intended to provide the courts, rather than an administrative
agency, with authority to hear discrimination cases.234 It does not
express any opinion about the courts' ability to construe Title
VII's statutory language.2 35
While there does not appear to be any statement in Title
VII's legislative history affirmatively granting the courts any
particular leeway in construing the statute, two legislators
predicted that the ambiguity of the language itself would lead to
such a result.236 Representatives Richard Poff and William
Cramer predicted:
The ambiguity of its language creates a cloud of obscurity
which conceals its potential consequences. While we are
unprepared to say that the ambiguity is deliberate and
calculated, it is difficult to believe that it is altogether
accidental.
Statutory
ambiguities
require
judicial
interpretation. In light of the trend court decisions have
taken in recent years, it is not unrealistic to predict that

231.
Posner, supra note 149, at 818.
232.
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 29, 128 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2515 (1964) (discussing how the original Title VII would have allowed the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to institute hearing procedures, but other
committee members preferred discrimination cases to be decided by the federal court).
233. Id.
234.
The sentence immediately followed a discussion concerning the breadth of the
proposed EEOC's authority. See id.
235.
See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 128 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2515-16 (1964) (discussing instead the need for an expeditious method of resolving
complaints, as opposed to granting broad authority for statutory interpretation).
236.
See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 112 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2479-80 (1964) (discussing the separate minority views of Representatives Richard H.
Poff and William Cramer).
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the interpretations the courts would make would be of the
broadest possible scope. What the courts interpret
tomorrow may be altogether different from what a majority
of the Members of Congress intended .... When the statute
is loosely drawn, vague, ambiguous and obscure, the
judicial branch is handed a blank check, signed by the
legislative branch.237
This passage, however, does not provide the type of
legislative mandate that Posner envisions the legislature
providing to the courts to warrant such an interpretation of Title
VII's express terms. 231
In the end, the legislative history of Title VII provides the
Court with little guidance regarding how to interpret the
statute's operative provisions and certainly does not provide the
courts with any instruction, permission, or mandate to construe
Title VII's provisions in derogation of its express statutory
language.
The third major factor used in statutory construction is to
look at the statute's broad purposes to determine whether a
particular interpretation is warranted. 239 However, even ignoring
the argument that consideration of a statute's broad purposes is
not an appropriate construction tool, the purpose of Title VII also
appears not to support the McDonnell Douglas standard.24 ° The
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas indicated that "[tihe
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens.
As discussed in Part III.A., supra, in at least some
circumstances,
McDonnell Douglas places
unnecessary
evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs or causes them to bear the

237.
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 112-13 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2479-80. For context, it should be noted that Mr. Poff was a representative from the state
of Virginia, and Mr. Cramer from Florida. H.R. Doc. No. 108-122, at 888, 1747 (2005).
238.
See Posner, supra note 149, at 818-19 (distinguishing interpretive latitude in
statutes whose language implies some flexibility in interpretation from those which are
more specific and rigid in their requirements); see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002)
(suggesting that Congress should direct courts more explicitly regarding statutory
construction).
239.
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734 (2005)
("Examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up the daily
fare of every appellate court in the country..
").
240.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
241.
Id.
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burden of convincing a court to modify existing case law. At
times, the framework clearly underenforces the rights granted by
the statute. 42 Even if the Court somehow construed McDonnell
Douglas as fulfilling Title VII's purpose in some factual
scenarios, it is troubling that the test does not fully enforce a
plaintiffs rights in others. Notably, even though it does not
appear as if the Court was trying to restrict the reach of Title VII
through the creation of the standard, it is questionable whether
the Court could use the statute's purpose to reach such a result.243
Although the McDonnell Douglas test can be said to
effectuate Title VII's purposes in cases with facts similar to Percy
Green's case, the fact that it significantly underenforces rights in
other circumstances demonstrates that the test is not fully
consistent
with a purposivist
approach
to statutory
construction.244
C. Applying a Common Law Framework to the McDonnell
Douglas Standard
One of the few statutory construction methods that may
describe, although not fully explain or justify, the McDonnell
Douglas test is the common law approach." As with the other
methods of statutory construction, there are several iterations of
the common law methodology to interpreting statutes.24 6
However, the unifying thread of common law methodology
appears to be its approval of and use of concerns other than the
text, legislative history, and purpose of the statute.4 7

242. See supra Part III.A.1 (observing that the plaintiff s burden to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination can exclude otherwise legitimate discrimination claims).
243. Popkin, supra note 140, at 604 ("[T]here is no nonpolitical principle which
justifies using statutory purpose to limit rather than expand a statute.").
244. See supra Part III.A.1 (explaining how the McDonnell Douglas test does not
provide plaintiffs with adequate protection).
245. While the Author does not endorse the general use of the common law approach
as a normative matter, it has been so embraced by others in the academic community. See
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3
(1985) (discussing the theory of common law interpretation).
246. For example, Thomas Merrill defines common law interpretation "to include all
potentially controversial forms of textual interpretation." Id. at 5. T. Alexander Aleinikoff
presents a "nautical" model of statutory interpretation whereby, "Congress... charts [an]
initial course" for a statute, but there is a recognition that Congress is unable to fully
anticipate all of the factual scenarios to which the statute will be applied. Aleinikoff,
supra note 149, at 21. The court system is then allowed to fill in gaps caused by these
anticipated scenarios. Id.
247. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 149, at 21 (distinguishing the "nautical" method,
which relies on current temporal context for statutory interpretation, from the
.archeological" method, which relies more on historical context and stare decisis).
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One commentator described the common law approach as
allowing consideration of "current values, such as ideas of
fairness, related statutory policies, and [evolving] ... values"
without masking these considerations as textual, intent, or
purpose concerns."' As the McDonnell Douglas court provided
little guidance as to why it created the three-part burden-shifting
framework, one explanation may be that it did not explicitly rely
on the text, legislative history, or purpose of the statute, but used
these considerations along with consideration of external factors
to create a test to deal with the emerging problem of indirect
discrimination.249
However, this explanation has several large problems. First,
it is not clear that the common law approach to statutory
construction should apply when the statutory language is not
ambiguous.25 ° In McDonnell Douglas, the court was not faced
with a situation "in which alternative understandings of the text
were available."251 Nor was this a case where the courts were
faced with a factual scenario that might arguably fall within the
contours of the statute, but that was not foreseen by the statute's
drafters."'
Also problematic is any lack of direct, or even indirect,
authority for creation of the standard. In characterizing the
common law powers of courts, Thomas Merrill indicates that
such power is at its most legitimate when such authority is
granted to the courts or when lawmaking is necessary to
preserve the underlying mandate of the statute.5 3

Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140, at 359.
248.
Two major criticisms of the common law approach deserve brief discussion. As
249.
the Supreme Court itself has mentioned, common law decision making raises concerns
about whether federal courts are exceeding their limited jurisdiction. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v.
Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) ("Although it is much too late to
deny that there is a significant body of federal law that has been fashioned by the federal
judiciary in the common-law tradition, it remains true that federal courts, unlike their
state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with openended lawmaking powers."). Second, "once Congress addresses a subject, even a subject
previously governed by federal common law, the justification for lawmaking by the federal
courts is greatly diminished. Thereafter, the task of the federal courts is to interpret and
apply statutory law, not to create common law." Id. at 95 n.34.
250.
See id. (discussing when the common law approach to statutory construction
may not be appropriate).
Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law,
251.
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 441 (1995).
See id. at 441-42 (asserting that courts engage in "judicial adventurism" when
252.
they attempt to fill gaps that are not provided for within the specific language of a
statute).
Merrill, supra note 245, at 46-48.
253.
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Under the heading of direct authority, the Court's authority
to engage in common law interpretation of statutes may either be
explicitly delegated by Congress, or the Court may believe it has
this delegated power based on long-standing tradition.254 For
example, the Court has adopted a common law approach to
maritime issues,255 to the Sherman Act,256 and to section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act.257
The
courts
have
sometimes
used
common
law
decisionmaking to not give effect to express statutory language. 258
For example, in Sherman Act cases, the court has held that to
give literal meaning to certain sections of the Act would "outlaw
the entire body of private contract law." '59 Thus, the court
explicitly imported the Rule of Reason, which has origins in the
common law, into the Sherman Act. 26" However, even in this
instance, the Court indicated that the legislative history of the
Sherman Act "makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts
to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on
261
common-law tradition."
There is no language in either Title VII or its legislative
history granting the courts direct authority to engage in common
law decisionmaking.2 62 Nor does it appear that there is any
implicit grant of such authority. Indeed, Posner has suggested
that a common law construction approach might not be
appropriate in the Title VII context. 262 He suggests that courts
should be reluctant to exercise such a power when the statute
appears "against a background of dissatisfaction with judicial
handling of the same subject under a previous statute or the

254.
Id. at 44.
255.
Id. at 30.
256.
Posner, supra note 149, at 818 (noting the use of common law methodology
when interpreting antitrust issues). Further, Congress has explicitly provided the courts
with the authority to engage in common law decisionmaking when applying Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8 (1974), as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082 ("[Tlhe Committee ...provided that [Rule 501] shall continue to
be developed by the courts ....[This standard] mandates the application of the principles
of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and
experience.").
257.
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855-56 (1987).
258.
See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-89
(1978) (arguing that the Sherman Act "cannot mean what it says," and interpreting it
accordingly).
259. Id. at 688.
260. Id. at 688-89.
261.
Id. at 688.
262. See generally supra Part III.
263.
Posner, supra note 149, at 818-19.
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common law," and he suggests that much labor and regulatory
legislation is of this character.26 4
Another
circumstance
under
which
common
law
decisionmaking is often used is when preemptive lawmaking is
required to preserve the statutory mandate.265 In these cases,
Merrill suggests that the Court has authority to "ask[] what
collateral or subsidiary rules are necessary in order to effectuate
or to avoid frustrating the specific intentions of the draftsmen."266
However, Merrill's approval of the permissibility of preemptive
lawmaking is based on an assumption that the courts will use
this tool sparingly and limit its use to "cases where it is truly
267
necessary."
Again, there is no indication that McDonnell Douglas was
needed to avoid frustrating the purpose of Title VII. 2" As
discussed in Part III.A, the framework may limit plaintiffs
with meritorious cases from proceeding to trial.6
Also
surprising was the Court's willingness to create the framework
without any discussion about whether it was even necessary.2 70
Prior to the adoption of the three-part burden-shifting test,
courts had used a less structured standard that mimicked Title
VII's statutory language.2 71 Indeed, this looser standard of
proof is one that, after more than 30 years of litigation, is now
being advocated in the academic literature.27 2
Other justifications for common law decisionmaking can
be drawn from Professor Mitchell Berman's work. 273 Berman
264. Id. at 818. In fairness, it should be noted that much of this congressional
dissatisfaction arose after the Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas. See H.R. REP. No.
102-40(11), at 1 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694 (asserting in the statement
of Summary and Purpose that one of the objectives of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "is to
respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that
were dramatically limited by those decisions").
265.
Merrill, supranote 245, at 36.
266. Id.
267.
Id. at 37.
268.
Schuman, supra note 10, at 70.
269. See supra Part III.A.
270.
Schuman, supra note 10, at 70.
271.
See Reid v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1972) (agreeing
with the district court's finding that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the
defendant's refusal to hire was based on a protected trait); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 442 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1971) (placing the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., No. 6580, 1971 WL 150, at *5
(W.D. Ky. June 23, 1971) (finding that a plaintiff must show discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence), affd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
272.
See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 95, at 2237-38 (arguing for a less structured
standard).
273.
Berman, supra note 15, at 92-93 (2004) (listing six factors a judge may draw
upon to make a decision).
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has suggested that courts are authorized to create decision
rules to serve adjudicatory and deterrent concerns.27 Even if
we transfer this same framework into the statutory context, it
is difficult to justify the creation of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.
Under the adjudicatory function, a court attempts to
create a rule that minimizes errors by the lower courts in
reaching a decision. 7 5 As Berman indicates, "[b]y minimizing
adjudicatory errors, a decision rule is likely at the same time
to optimize compliance with the operative proposition."2 6 First,
it should be noted that there was no discussion in McDonnell
Douglas either about lower courts struggling with evidence in
civil rights cases or about confusion causing noncompliance
with the operative provision. 7 7 Further, the complexity of
McDonnell Douglas spawned decades of litigation about the
allocation allcaton
off brdes
burdens oof prducionandpersuasion.
production and p.
278 Courts
and litigants continue to struggle with individual pieces of the
proof structure and how that structure should be used. 9 Even
today, it is not clear that the framework satisfies the
adjudicatory function in all cases.2 "'
Decision rules may also serve a deterrent function when a
rule is crafted to secure greater compliance with the
2 '
underlying operative provision such as the exclusionary rule."
McDonnell Douglas does serve a deterrent function. By
requiring
employers
to
articulate
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for their actions, it encourages
employers to consider the reasons underlying employment
decisions and to take care in making such decisions.28 2 While
such a result is desirable, it contravenes the common law

274.
Id. at 92-96 (2004) (describing the basis for such suggestions). Berman also
suggests that decision rules can serve protective, fiscal, and institutional functions. Id. at
94-95. None of these concerns appear to be significantly present in the McDonnell
Douglas context.
275.
Id. at 93-94.
276.
Id. at 93.
277.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (listing the
Court's reasons for granting certiorari).
278.
See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993) (stating that
McDonnell Douglas represents the Court's establishing an initial rebuttable
presumption); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-54 (1989) (discussing the
various standards and burdens of proof in Title VII cases).
279.
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 6, at 860-62 (describing the ambiguities created by
the McDonnell Douglas framework and calling for its abandonment).
280.
Id. at 860-61.
281.
Berman, supra note 15, at 93-94.
282.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 264-65.
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employment rights that employers enjoy, which were not taken
away by Title VII.2 3 Further, it is not clear that, prior to
creation of the standard, employers were shying away from
providing reasons for their actions. Indeed, from a
practitioner's perspective it would be bad strategy to defend a
discrimination claim by stating that there was no reason for an
action or to simply fail to present evidence of such a reason.
As this section demonstrates, justifying McDonnell
Douglas under a common law methodology is difficult because
it is not clear that the standard was implemented pursuant to
proper authority or that it fits within the normal policy
parameters of when such rulemaking is allowed.28 ' However,
even assuming that use of a common law method is
appropriate in the context of a nonambiguous statute, it is not
clear that the McDonnell Douglas standard would fit within
the constraints of common law statutory interpretation.
Ideally, the interpretation of the statute offered by the Court
under this approach would be one "which fits most logically
and comfortably into the body of both previously and
subsequently enacted law."8 5 As discussed in Parts III.A and
B, the three-part burden-shifting framework does not meet
this goal.286

283.
See, e.g., Miller v. Auto. Club of N.M., Inc., 420 F.3d 1098, 1128 (10th Cir. 2005)
(summarizing New Mexico common law); Layton v. MMM Design Group, 32 F. App'x 677,
679-80 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing Virginia common law).
284.
Schuman, supra note 10, at 70.
285.
W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1990). In his dissent,
Justice Stevens indicated that [iln recent years the Court has vacillated between a
purely literal approach to the task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks
guidance from historical context, legislative history, and prior cases identifying the
purpose that motivated the legislation." Id. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286.
See supra Parts III.A-B. This Article does not discuss McDonnell Douglas's
viability under the political model of statutory construction because there is no indication
that the Court was addressing those concerns when creating the test. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (failing to mention or address the political
model of statutory construction). The collaborative model of statutory interpretation
assumes that it is proper for the courts to incorporate political values into the
interpretation process, even if those political values did not originate with the legislature.
Popkin, supra note 140, at 590-91. Under this model, it is "normatively desirable" for
judges to interject political values into the process. Id. at 590. Under the political
reasoning model, it is appropriate for judges' political suppositions and other assumptions
to be incorporated into the decisionmaking process. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140,
at 347. The creators of the latter model recognize that the text, history and application of
the statute will limit the choices regarding how to interpret a statute, but that, among
this list, "the actual choice will not be 'objectively' determinable." Id.
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D. Justifying McDonnell Douglas Based on Jurisprudential
Concerns
Perhaps the best explanation for the continued viability of
McDonnell Douglas relates to jurisprudential concerns, rather
than statutory ones. As Justice Souter noted in 1993:
Cases, such as McDonnell Douglas, that set forth an order
of proof necessarily go beyond the minimum necessary to
settle the narrow dispute presented, but evidentiary
frameworks set up in this manner are not for that reason
subject to summary dismissal in later cases as products of
mere dicta. Courts and litigants rely on this Court to
structure lawsuits based on federal statutes in an orderly
and sensible manner, and we should not casually abandon
the structures adopted.28 7
In at least one case, the Supreme Court has suggested that
even though the original construction of a statute was not proper,
the fact that a decision is long-standing precedent may justify its
continued force.288 Thus, the principle of stare decisis, with its
focus on "[tihe interests of stability, predictability, efficiency,
consistency and reliance" might justify continued adherence to
8
the three-step burden-shifting framework."
However, this argument is easily countered in three ways.
First, it is not clear that McDonnell Douglas has resulted in the
"stability, predictability, efficiency, consistency and reliance" that
would require continued adherence to it. Second, the lack of
textual and other support for the test, as well as any discussion
about why such a radical departure from these considerations
might be warranted, lends support to the argument that the test
is invalid ab initio. Further, as suggested by Berman in the
constitutional context, it may be that decisional rules are entitled
to less deference in the stare decisis context than explicit
interpretation of statutes.2 ° Therefore, to the extent that the
framework is merely a decisional rule or an evidentiary standard,
it deserves less deference in the stare decisis context.
A second jurisprudential concern that may motivate the
continued use of McDonnell Douglas is a belief that if the
standard was an improper interpretation of Title VII, Congress
287.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 540 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
288.
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(explaining that "even if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the
Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice today").
289.
Aleinikoff, supra note 149, at 51.
290.
Berman, supra note 15, at 102-04 (discussing the interaction between federal
courts and Congress with respect to statutory and constitutional issues).
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would have acted to remedy the problem, as it has done with
other court rulings on Title VII issues. 91 It might be that we are
not as concerned with activism in the statutory context because
"if an interpretation of a statute misapprehends the actual intent
of Congress or is proved by experience to have
been unwise,
292
remedial legislation can be promptly enacted."
However, many courts and commentators question whether
293 In
Congress has already acted to nullify McDonnell Douglas.
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress clarified that a plaintiff
establishes an unlawful employment practice when he or she
291.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting).
292.
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 86 n.15 (1981).
Indeed, Congress has taken steps to remedy other tests created by the Court. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the dissenting opinion lamented that "[tioday's creation of a new
set of rules for 'mixed-motives' cases is not mandated by the statute itself." Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 287 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Several years
later Congress amended Title VII to create a new mixed-motive framework. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76.
293.
See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 9, at 1566 (hoping to show that McDonnell Douglas
is no longer a viable framework after Desert Palace); Sullivan, supra note 9, at 933-36
(discussing Desert Palaceand questioning whether the standard articulated in McDonnell
Douglas is viable after the 1991 amendments to Title VII); Van Detta, supra note 201, at
124-26 (arguing that Congress's amendments to Title VII in 1991 were a response to
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny); see also Rollins v. Mo. Dep't of Conservation, 315 F.
Supp. 2d 1011, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 2004) (questioning the validity of McDonnell Douglas after
Desert Palace,but choosing to apply the burden-shifting framework anyway); Dare v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994 (D. Minn. 2003) (stating that "the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 directly conflicts with.., the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm").
But see Christopher R. Hedican, Jason M. Hedican & Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell
Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 395-402 (2004) (stating that the Supreme
Court recognized the continued viability of McDonnell Douglas in cases after Desert
Palaceand the 1991 amendments to Title VII). It should be noted that the Eighth Circuit
has consistently reiterated the continued viability of McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Strate
v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005); Griffith v. City of Des
Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2004).
Currently, the federal law is in a state of flux regarding the intersection of the
1991 amendments to Title VII, Desert Palace, and the McDonnell Douglas test. See
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 934 ("The ramifications of DesertPalace are as yet unclear, but
the broadest view is that the case collapsed all individual disparate treatment cases into a
single analytical method, thereby effectively destroying McDonnell Douglas. The decision,
however, can be read more narrowly. Because footnote one specifies that the Court was
not deciding the effects of this decision 'outside of the mixed-motive context,' McDonnell
Douglas may continue to structure some cases, although its viability under Title VII is
suspect." (footnote omitted)); Corbett, supra note 9, at 1555-60 (comparing differing
standards of proof among McDonnell Douglas, Price Waterhouse, and Desert Palace after
the 1991 amendments to Title VII). Some courts have held that McDonnell Douglas was
not affected by the 1991 amendments or the Desert Palace decision. See, e.g., Strate, 398
F.3d at 1017; Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735-36. Other courts have indicated that the third
prong of the McDonnell Douglas test should be modified to allow the plaintiff either to
prove pretext or mixed motive. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312
(5th Cir. 2004). As discussed earlier, some courts take a third approach to this question,
indicating that McDonnell Douglas is no longer a viable method for proving
discrimination. Dare, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
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"demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice." 94 In Desert
Palace v. Costa, the Supreme Court indicated that the 1991
amendments allowed plaintiffs to proceed under a mixed-motive
theory using either circumstantial or direct evidence of
discrimination. 95 The Court stated that to prevail on a mixedmotive claim of discrimination, the plaintiff needs to prove that
the employment decision at issue was, at least in part, motivated
by an improper factor.296 The Court's opinion does not discuss how
the 1991 amendments affected single-motive discrimination
cases, and the issue remains unsettled.297
While the focus of this Article primarily relates to the
propriety of the Court's interpretation of Title VII prior to the
1991 amendments, the continued viability of McDonnell Douglas
based on jurisprudential concerns is significantly affected by
these later amendments. 29 First, the amendments provide an
argument that McDonnell Douglas is no longer viable.299 Second,
to the extent the courts successfully consider mixed-motive
claims under the 1991 amendments without reference to
McDonnell Douglas, it diminishes any argument that the courts
need the
framework to better analyze evidence in discrimination
30
cases.
IV. EXAMINING MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AS MERELY AN

EVIDENTIARY TOOL
One of the reasons for the continued viability of McDonnell
Douglas is the belief that McDonnell Douglas does not actually
prescribe the elements of a cause of action, but rather merely

294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). At the same time, Congress also provided
employers with a limited affirmative defense under Title VII, providing that where the
employer can establish that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor," it can restrict a plaintiffs damages to injunctive and
declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
295. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-100 (2003).
296. Id. at 101.
297. The legislative history of the 1991 amendments provides little guidance on
whether the amendments were intended to affect McDonnell Douglas. In a portion of the
legislative history discussing changes to disparate impact burdens of proof, the committee
indicated that disparate impact burdens are different than disparate treatment claims.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 7-8 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 699-701
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). However, this is the only
specific mention of the case in the legislative history of the 1991 amendments.
298. See supra notes 293-297 and accompanying text.
299. Id.
300. Corbett, supra note 9, at 1551-52.
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serves as an evidentiary framework that courts use in
considering whether a plaintiffs evidence demonstrates
discrimination. 0 1 While it is true that the courts continue to
describe McDonnell Douglas as an evidentiary standard," ' it is
not used in this manner. Rather, the circuit courts have almost
universally indicated that juries are not to be instructed on the
framework.33 As discussed below, this practice leads to even
larger questions about the test's legal heritage. 4
Despite these problems, and even if there is some
justification for the belief that the framework serves as an
evidentiary standard, it is not clear that the standard is
supported by Title VII, at least not in all discrimination cases. 5
Even if we assume that the courts inherently possess the ability
to determine burdens of production and persuasion in a case
where the legislature has not chosen to do so, the issue still
remains: from what were the burdens articulated in McDonnell
Douglas derived? The courts' ability to fashion such burdens
should not be standardless. Rather, "burdens of proof should be
allocated by the policy choices of the substantive law .
,,306 It is
not clear that the McDonnell Douglas framework serves the
purposes of the statute in all cases.
A. An Evidentiary Framework Without a Factfinder
One place where confusion over the burden-shifting
framework's proper use is most visible relates to jury
instructions. 7 When discrimination cases go to trial, the
McDonnell Douglas test raises unnecessary complications for
both the judge and the jury. 8 Even thirty years after the test's

301.
Id. at 1555-57.
302.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) ("The prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas ...is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.");
Gold, supra note 92, at 185-86 (describing the McDonnell Douglas framework as
procedural).
303.
See infra notes 308-316.
304. Id.
305.
See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Magnuson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the burden-shifting framework is not
consistent with Title VII).
306.
21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5122 (2d ed. 2005).
307.
See, e.g., Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing
problems that arise when McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework language is
used in jury instructions); Lewis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 845 F.2d 624, 634 (6th Cir.
1988) (commenting that McDonnell Douglas instructions "confuse the jurors with legal
definitions of the burdens of proof, persuasion and production").
308.
See Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir.
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creation, courts continue to struggle with how to incorporate its
rationale into jury instructions.3 "9 Indeed, the circuits are
currently split regarding how and whether to instruct the jury on
the three-part framework."' Some courts incorporate McDonnell
Douglas into the jury instructions by instructing the jury on the
changing burdens of production and persuasion.311 However, most
circuits have issued opinions indicating that McDonnell Douglas
should not be used in jury instructions.312 The Third Circuit has
2006) ("[T]he 'prima facie case and the shifting burdens confuse lawyers and judges, much
less juries, who do not have the benefit of extensive study of the law on the subject.'"
(quoting Mogull v. Commercial Real Estate Group, 744 A.2d 1186, 1199 (N.J. 2000)));
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) (conceding that "subtleties" of
the burden-shifting framework have created difficulties for judges and jurors); see also
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment
DiscriminationCases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 760 (1995) (observing that the three-stage
McDonnell Douglas framework has divided circuit courts and confused jurors).
309.
See, e.g., Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 538-41 (9th Cir. 2003)
(evaluating the role of McDonnell Douglas factors injury instructions).
310.
Compare Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that it is proper to instruct the jury to consider facts necessary to establish the
prima facie case but it is error to instruct the jury on the burden-shifting framework), and
Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was not
error to "guide [ the jury through a three-stage order of proof as opposed to instructing the
jury solely on the ultimate issue of... discrimination"), with Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (stressing that the McDonnell Douglas
framework is not necessary and is improper for the jury to consider), Ryther v. KARE 11,
108 F.3d 832, 849 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Loken, J., dissenting) (stating that "the jury
need only decide the ultimate issue of intentional... discrimination"), Gehring v. Case
Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the jury need only consider whether
the plaintiff is a victim of discrimination), Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 380-81 (2d
Cir. 1994) (noting that the terms "prima facie case" and "defendants' burden of
produc[tion]" created a risk of confusing the jury (internal quotation marks omitted)),
Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Instructing the jury on
the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of proof is
unnecessary and confusing."), Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308
(10th Cir. 1990) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas guidelines are not relevant to the
jury), Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988)
(observing that "[tihe shifting burdens of production of Burdine. .. are beyond the
function and expertise of the jury"), and Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1016 (explaining that the
phrase "prima facie case" and other "legal jargon" need not be explained to the jury).
311.
E.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir.
2005) (noting that "[tihe district court instructed the jury to evaluate the evidence by
applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework"); Kozlowski v. Hampton
Sch. Bd., 77 F. App'x 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing use of the McDonnell Douglas
framework as it relates to jury instructions); Ryther, 108 F.3d at 846-47 (agreeing that
the jury should be instructed as to the burdens of the parties); Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882
F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1989) (approving instruction to jury on shifting burdens).
See, e.g., Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997-98 (10th Cir.
312.
2005) (asserting that the McDonnell Douglas framework increases chances of jury error
because of its complexity); Williams v. Eau Claire Pub. Sch., 397 F.3d 441, 446 (6th Cir.
2005) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework may, but need not, be incorporated
into jury instructions); Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir.
2004) ("This Court has consistently held that district courts should not frame jury
instructions based upon the intricacies of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
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taken an intermediate approach, explaining that "the subtleties
of the McDonnell Douglas framework
are
generally
inappropriate" for juror consideration, but that judges may find it
necessary to propound instructions that contain portions of the
framework.3 13 As discussed below, each side of this issue
highlights more complex problems with McDonnell Douglas as an
evidentiary standard.
The best argument against construing McDonnell Douglas
as an evidentiary framework is the fact that the majority of
circuits discourage the use of the three-part burden-shifting
framework in jury instructions."' Thus, if the test is designed to
help factfinders sift through evidence to determine whether
discrimination has occurred, the courts have essentially made
the test meaningless at trial in cases presented to a jury.315 In
these cases, McDonnell Douglas has become an evidentiary
standard without a factfinder.
There appear to be two different rationales for such
holdings. Some courts believe that any discussion of the threepart burden-shifting test in jury instructions would be so
confusing that the jury may not be able to render a verdict based
on such instructions.31 6 Other circuits eliminate McDonnell
analysis"); Sanders v. New York City Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir.
2004) (commenting that the jury should not be instructed on the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework); Brown v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 338 F.3d 586, 592 (6th Cir.
2003) (indicating a preference to avoid using the McDonnell Douglas framework in jury
instructions); Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that the burden-shifting issues of McDonnell Douglas are not in the realm of the
jury); Sharkey v. LASMO, 214 F.3d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2000) (indicating that McDonnell
Douglas instructions should not be provided to the jury in an ADEA case); Dudley, 166
F.3d at 1322 (emphasizing that McDonnell Douglas is inappropriate for jury instruction);
Ryther, 108 F.3d at 849-50 (Loken, J., dissenting) (concluding that the McDonnell
Douglas framework should be the province of attorneys and judges); Gehring, 43 F.3d at
343 (noting that the "burden-shifting model applies to pretrial proceedings, not to the
jury's evaluation of evidence at trial"); Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 731
(8th Cir. 1992) (identifying "that the McDonnell Douglas 'ritual is not well suited as a
detailed instruction to the jury'" (quoting Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d
18, 20 (8th Cir. 1985))); Mullen, 853 F.2d at 1137 (observing that jury instructions
regarding burden-shifting were "overly complex"); Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 316,
335 (4th Cir. 1980) (explaining that all of the elements of McDonnell Douglas may not be
relevant to jury instructions).
313.
Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 348 (3d Cir. 1999); see also
Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 249-50 (noting that most aspects of McDonnell Douglas are
inappropriate for juries but some elements may, nonetheless, be presented to the jury).
314. See cases cited supra note 312 (providing examples of circuits discouraging the
use of the McDonnell Douglas framework in jury instructions).
315.
See Gerrilyn G. Brill, Instructing the Jury in an Employment Discrimination
Case, 1998 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2,
4.6 (1998), available at http://www.fclr.orgarticles/
1998fedctslrev2.wpd (noting that once the case is submitted to the jury, the McDonnell
Douglas formulation is irrelevant).
316.
See, e.g., Sanders, 361 F.3d at 758 (stating that McDonnell Douglas instructions
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Douglas from jury instructions not only because of its tendency to
be confusing, but also because the courts believe that McDonnell
Douglas and its related presumptions no longer apply at the trial
stage. 7 In these circuits, the "presumption[s] and burdens
inherent in the McDonnell Douglas formulation drop out of
consideration when the case is submitted to the jury on the
merits."3 1 In other words, the trial judge may use the McDonnell
Douglas standard to determine whether summary judgment is
proper, but once it has served that function, it is no longer
appropriate for the factfinder to use the test to make a finding of
discrimination.3 19
Considering the degree to which courts have stopped using
the framework as an evidentiary standard in the courtroom, it is
difficult to articulate how it can continue to be justified as one.
Perhaps one way around this dilemma is to characterize the test
as an evidentiary standard that can be used by judges in pretrial
proceedings and to determine whether a directed verdict is
appropriate. However, this characterization also raises problems.
To the extent that McDonnell Douglas is no longer a trial
standard, it appears to occupy a unique procedural niche-one
that is not supported by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 °
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court may only grant
summary judgment when the evidence before the court
demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."32' The standard for establishing entitlement to a
judgment as a matter of law is that "there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on

create a risk of jury confusion); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 540-41 (9th
Cir. 2003), (noting that the technical aspects of the McDonnell Douglas framework may
confuse juries); Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1322 (observing that McDonnell Douglas jury
instructions do not always successfully track the burden-shifting framework and confuse
juries); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Instructing the
jury on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of proof
is unnecessary and confusing.").
317.
See, e.g., Gehring, 43 F.3d at 343 (indicating that McDonnell Douglas is only for
use in pretrial proceedings).
318.
Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990); see
also Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 998 (10th Cir. 2005) (endorsing
Messina's criticism of using the McDonnell Douglas framework in jury instructions).
319.
See Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Reinke Insulation Co., 347
F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 2003) (commenting that the burden-shifting framework is
intended for pretrial proceedings such as summary judgment and discovery and "falls
away" at trial).
320.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (discussing
summary judgment standard).
321.
FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
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contemplate that the court ruling on summary judgment will be
using the same standard to determine whether liability is
appropriate as that being considered by the jury. 23 However, by
isolating McDonnell Douglas into a summary judgment standard
only, the courts are using one standard to determine whether a
case should go to trial and having the jury apply quite a different
standard at the trial itself.
This is simply not the approach allowed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.3 24 These problems are further highlighted if

the court uses the McDonnell Douglas framework to determine
summary judgment issues and then uses the 1991 amendments
to the Civil Rights Act to instruct the jury. 25
It appears that in the past several years, courts have become
uncomfortable with the dichotomy between McDonnell Douglas
and the trial standard. 326 For example, in a recent decision, the
Seventh Circuit held that the outcome of the McDonnell Douglas
test for the facts at hand was not important. 27 In affirming a
grant of summary judgment for the defendant, a panel of the
court noted that "[tihe [McDonnell Douglas] formula has its place
but does not displace the general standards for summary
judgment."32s Therefore, even though the plaintiff had presented
evidence that the employer was "bending the rules" to give the
available job to a particular applicant, the court found that no
reasonable jury would conclude that the rules were bent for
329
discriminatory reasons.
It may be appropriate to argue that McDonnell Douglas
remains an appropriate jury standard, and that the courts that
hold to the contrary are simply wrong. However, even in circuits
that allow juries to be instructed on the McDonnell Douglas

322.
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
323.
See, e.g., Walker v. Abbott Labs., 416 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
the judge and jury use the same considerations to determine liability).
Id. (describing the summary judgment standard and its applicability as a
324.
separate standard from the McDonnell Douglas framework).
Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745 n.9 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson,
325.
J., concurring) (illustrating the impracticality of applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework at the summary judgment stage and subsequently employing the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 at trial).
326.
See, e.g., Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 615-16 (8th Cir.
1997) (noting that while summary judgment should be cautiously granted in employment
discrimination claims, the standard for summary judgment is unchanged).
327.
Walker, 416 F.3d at 645.
328.
Id.
329.
Id. at 644-45.
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framework, 330 it is not clear that juries use the test as merely a
way of analyzing evidence. Instead, juries use the framework to
create the elements of the offense itself. As discussed earlier,
using the framework to create the elements of a Title VII
violation is not supported by the Act's statutory language,
legislative history, or broader purposes.
Thus, in these circuits, the jury can be given an instruction
indicating that a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, that
once this prima facie case is established an inference of
discrimination is created, and that the defendant must rebut.this
inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions.33 Once the defendant has articulated this reason,
the plaintiff must establish that discrimination was the true
reason behind the employer's conduct.3 33
It is difficult to construct a believable argument that when
jurors are given this instruction, they merely use McDonnell
Douglas to determine whether circumstantial evidence of

330.
See, e.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 58 (1st
Cir. 2005) (finding that the district court instructed the jury to evaluate the evidence by
applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework); Kozlowski v. Hampton Sch.
Bd., 77 F. App'x 133, 141-42 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing use of the McDonnell Douglas
framework in jury instructions); Brown v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 338 F.3d 586, 595-98
(6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., concurring) (approving the use of McDonnell Douglas in jury
instructions). But see Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137
(4th Cir. 1988) (noting that "[tihe shifting burdens of production of Burdine ...are
beyond the function and expertise of the jury" and are "overly complex").
Even some circuits that do not generally countenance the use of the standard,
will find that it is harmless error for such instructions to be given. E.g., Sanders v. New
York City Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758-59 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding it was
harmless error for the district court to instruct a jury as to the burden-shifting
framework); Vincini v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co., 41 F. App'x 512, 514 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding
no error in the administration of McDonnell Douglas jury instructions); Dudley v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (deciding that McDonnell Douglas
jury instructions were harmless error). The Third Circuit allows the court to instruct the
jury regarding the factual predicates underlying McDonnell Douglas, but not on the
burden of articulation that shifts to the defendant. See Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
207 F.3d 207, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that McDonnell Douglas instruction on
defendant's intermediate burden of production constituted error).
331.
See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson,
J., concurring) (noting that "[tihe burden-shifting framework is not supported in the
language of the statute, nor does it impose liability under Title VII").
332.
See supra Parts III.A-B; see also Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167 n.9
(6th Cir. 1993) (permitting jury instructions on three-stage framework).
333.
See, e.g., Sanders, 361 F.3d at 758 (explaining that after the defendant
articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to establish that the reason was pretextual); Cooper v. Paychex, Inc., Nos. 971645,-1543,-1720, 1998 WL 637274, at *8 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1998) (unpublished table
decision) (discussing the burden shifting); Lafate v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 123 F. Supp.
2d 773, 786-87 (D. Del. 2000) (comparing relative weight of shifting burdens of proof
between plaintiff and defendant).
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discrimination exists. Rather, stronger argument supports the
conclusion that jurors actually use the test to determine the
elements of a Title VII violation." 4 This is true for several
reasons.
First, jurors are not presented with the evidence in a
manner that would lead us to believe that they are actually
treating the three inquiries of the test separately. At the time
that the jurors are considering whether the defendant has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions,
the jurors have already heard the plaintiffs evidence about
whether such a reason should be believed or not.335 It strains
credulity to believe that jurors are parsing out the evidence of
pretext at the time that they are determining whether the
defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its conduct. Further, numerous courts have indicated their
doubts about whether lay jurors can understand and apply
shifting burdens of production and persuasion.336 It is both the
order of consideration and the shifting burdens that give
McDonnell Douglas its only arguable usefulness in considering
evidence."' Yet, neither of these benefits is realized given the
current way of presenting evidence and instructing juries.
Second, the use of the three-part test as an actual jury
instruction will likely cause juries to overstep the limitations of
the test. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court clarified that
determinations relating to steps one and two of the McDonnell
Douglas framework "can involve no credibility assessment"
because "the burden-of-production determination necessarily
precedes the credibility-assessment stage."338 As most juries are
instructed that they are to be the judges of credibility in a trial, it

334. See Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie
Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 389 (1997) (contending that juries are
not likely to be able to perform the "mental gymnastics" required by the McDonnell
Douglas framework and noting that, "[a]s a practical matter, the jury will have decided
the case when it makes the initial credibility determination").
335. See Brill, supra note 315, 4.6 (suggesting that the order in which evidence is
presented at trial is not conducive to assessing each part of the framework individually).
336. See, e.g., Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004)
(stating that a jury can be mislead by focusing on burden-shifting); Sanders, 361 F.3d at
758 (stating that burden-shifting instructions likely confuse juries); Sanghvi v. City of
Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 540-41 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing jury confusion resulting from
instructions including details of the burden-shifting framework); Dudley v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting potential jury confusion arising
from unfamiliar terminology and complexity of the burden-shifting framework).
337. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993) (observing that "the
McDonnell Douglas presumption is a procedural device, designed only to establish an
order of proof and production").
338. Id. at 509-10 & n.3.
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seems likely that absent a contrary instruction, the jury will
make credibility assessments in determining whether the
plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. Thus, for example, when a jury is making a
determination about whether the plaintiff was qualified for the
position in question, it is likely that the jury is weighing the
evidence presented by both the plaintiff and the defendant on
this issue. Such an inquiry would transform the McDonnell
Douglas requirement from an evidentiary tool into the actual
elements of the case.
B. Even if McDonnell Douglas Is Used Solely as an Evidentiary
Framework, Its HeritageIs Not Wholly Satisfying
While the viability of McDonnell Douglas as a trial standard
diminishes, it continues to have force as a standard for helping
courts to determine whether a plaintiffs evidence is strong
enough to survive summary judgment.339 Even if we assume that
McDonnell Douglas acts as an evidentiary framework in this
context, and that courts have the ability to create burdens of
production and persuasion when Congress has failed to do so,
McDonnell Douglas'sexistence still is not completely justified.
When considering whether and how to create such proof
structures, courts often use three different considerations: the
substantive policy being enforced, the possession of proof, and the
probability of a certain set of facts occurring.3 4 ° As discussed in
Part II.C, none of these factors were articulated by the Supreme
Court when it created the McDonnell Douglas test.34 '
Importantly, McDonnell Douglas is not supported by the three
normal considerations that typically are used to create such
standards.
It makes sense that when a court is determining how to
allocate burdens of production and persuasion in a case, it would
"begin with the policy of the substantive law being enforced."3 2
Given the broad, remedial purposes of Title VII, it makes sense

339.
Such a discussion must necessarily place aside concerns that the use of a
summary judgment standard separate from a trial standard does not appear to be
countenanced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra Part IV.A (explaining
how and why courts struggle to incorporate the McDonnell Douglas test and its rationale
into jury instructions).
340.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 306, § 5122.
341.
See Schuman, supra note 10, at 69-70 (observing that the McDonnell Douglas
court failed to justify how the burden-shifting framework furthers the policy goals of Title
VII or makes the fact-finding process more efficient).
342.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 306, § 5122.
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to allocate the burdens in favor of the plaintiff who "seeks to
vindicate the policy of the substantive law."343
It is certainly arguable that McDonnell Douglas, as
originally crafted, accomplished this goal, and that subsequent
clarifications of the standard watered down these benefits.3 44
However, it is not clear that even in its original iteration,
McDonnell Douglas favored plaintiffs. As discussed in Part III.A,
the prima facie case unnecessarily cramped plaintiffs' cases into
a mold that did not fit all factual scenarios where discrimination
may have been present. Further, the dichotomy that the
standard created between circumstantial and direct evidence
unnecessarily complicated the presentation of proof.345 It also
created opportunities for lawyers to argue about which proof
structure was appropriate, rather than whether the evidence
itself was probative of discrimination.3 46 Given the looser
standards that were being used by courts prior to the adoption of
McDonnell Douglas, it is difficult to see how the allocation of
burdens under the latter framework favors plaintiffs.
The second factor courts often consider in determining how
to allocate burdens of production and persuasion is the
probability of certain facts.347 In other words, courts consider
"what is the most likely state of affairs in situations like this? 3 48
Courts will often "place the burdens of proof on the party
asserting the least probable fact or set of facts."3 49 It appears that
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is an attempt to create
such a framework.35 ° It essentially requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the most common reasons for the nonhiring of
an individual-lack of qualifications, failure to apply, and lack of
an open position-are absent.3 5 ' However, as discussed above,

Id.
343.
See generally Malamud, supra note 95, at 2275 (mentioning that McDonnell
344.
Douglasoriginated as a way of "smoking out" evidence of an employer's adverse action).
See Smith, supra note 334, at 388 (demonstrating that the differing proof
345.
schemes for direct and circumstantial evidence frustrate the goals of predictability and
utility for the factfinder).
346. Id. at 385-86 (observing that adept trial lawyers take advantage of the difficulty
in identifying evidence as direct or circumstantial to advantage their client).
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 306, § 5122.
347.
348.
Id. (quoting HENRY BRANDIS & KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS AND BROUN ON
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE 127 (5th ed. 1998)).
349.
Id.
350.
See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 248, 253-54 (1981)
(discussing shifting burdens of presumption and production).
351.
See id. (noting that the prima facie case functions to eliminate "the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection").
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there are many scenarios when the lack of these elements should
not raise an inference of discrimination.3 2
Even ignoring this problem, though, the remaining burdens
of the test do not appear to comport with the probability theory of
structuring burdens of production and persuasion. If the courts
truly believed that the establishment of a prima facie case
created a strong inference of discrimination, it would make sense
to then place the burden on the defendant to actually prove that
discrimination was not the cause of its actions. This is the proof
structure that exists for claims brought under a direct evidence
framework.3 5 3 That the Court chose not to do so lends substantial
credibility to the argument that the prima facie case is not a good
tool for creating an inference of discrimination in the first
place.354
The third factor that courts often consider in allocating
burdens is the possession of proof.355 "Here courts look to see
whether one party has superior access to the evidence needed to
prove the fact. If so, then that party must bear the burdens of
proof."356 The second prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework
is designed to address the possession of proof problem.5 7 After
all, the employer is the entity most likely to know the reason for
the employment action. 35 ' The employer, therefore, is required to
at least articulate the reason for its action. However, portions of
the prima facie case also appear to be areas where the employer
would possess the required evidence. For example, in many
instances, the employer possesses information about the
qualifications necessary for a position and about whether it
continued to seek applicants after a position was filled. Yet,
inexplicably, the plaintiff must present some evidence of these
factors to make a prima facie case.
352.
See Smith, supra note 334, at 377-78 (concluding that inferring discriminatory
intent based on the plaintiffs presentation of the prima facie case is "logically weak").
353.
See, e.g., Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 584 n.10 (6th Cir.
2003) (describing the standard for proving discrimination via direct evidence); Pope v.
Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., No. 02-10274-BC, 2003 WL 22867629, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2003)
(discussing consequences of offering direct evidence).
354.
See Malamud, supra note 95, at 2244-45 (demonstrating that "the prima facie
case's evidentiary weakness undermines any attempt to draw a strong inference of
discrimination from the proven prima facie case").
355.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 306, § 5122.
356.
Id. (footnote omitted).
357.
See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981)
(describing shifting burdens of proof).
358.
See Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimination:
The Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 9 (2005) (observing
that the burden-shifting framework acknowledges the employer's greater access to the
reasons for its action).
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While these underlying issues are problematic, there is a
larger concern about why creation of the framework was even
necessary in the first place. As discussed earlier, lower courts did
not appear to be having problems with weighing evidence in
discrimination cases prior to its adoption." 9 And, while the Court
has noted that "[cionventional rules of civil litigation generally
apply in Title VII cases," they have failed to explain how the
burden-shifting framework enunciated in McDonnell Douglas
follows these same conventional rules.36 ° Further, given the
severe flaws in the test, it remains questionable whether the test
serves any purpose in litigation that "the general rules of civil
litigation do not serve... equally well."3 6'
C. A Suggestion to Eliminate or at Least Restrict the
Applicability of the McDonnell Douglas Test
It is important to be mindful of the ease of criticizing judicial
opinions without discussing a solution to the problems the
opinions originally sought to address, albeit imperfectly. To
simply disparage the McDonnell Douglas test may leave the
reader with the impression that while the test is perhaps not
perfect, it may be, to recast a phrase from Winston Churchill, the
worst way to evaluate discrimination claims, except for all of the
other ways that have been tried. To the extent that this Article
convinces the reader that the McDonnell Douglas test lacks a
satisfying connection to Title VII's statutory language, the task
then becomes to provide a better regime of proof should the
courts decide to abandon the three-part burden-shifting
framework.
In evaluating claims of discrimination under Title VII,
courts should simply use the standard enunciated in the
statutory text itself. In other words, when considering whether a
plaintiff has presented enough evidence to proceed to trial or to
prevail at trial, the decisionmaker would determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate "that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice."3 2

359.
See Van Detta, supra note 201, at 84-85 (2003) ("Title VII litigation proceeded
quite nicely ... without the 'benefit' of a burden-shifting scheme.").
360.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989); see also supra Part
III.A.4.
361.
See Malamud, supra note 95, at 2275 (arguing for the abandonment of the
McDonnell Douglas structure).
362.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). Although the Author believes that use of the
"motivating factor" language is appropriate in both single-motive and mixed-motive cases
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This proposal has clear benefits from a textualist statutoryconstruction perspective as it clarifies that the legal standard to
be used by the courts in evaluating claims is the same standard
provided by Congress. 3 There is nothing in the legislative
history of the statute that suggests that Congress intended the
words to be interpreted in a restrictive or counterintuitive
manner."' From a purposivist perspective, the inquiry focuses
the court's attention on whether discrimination occurred, and
away from other, often irrelevant, inquiries, such as whether the
plaintiff is qualified for the position in question or whether the
case is based on circumstantial or direct evidence.
The standard draws strength from the fact that it is already
successfully used in single-motive, direct evidence cases365 and in
mixed-motive
discrimination
cases,
whether
based on
circumstantial or direct evidence. 66 Eliminating this distinction
of terminology in single-motive, circumstantial evidence cases
would allow the courts to focus more attentively to the real
question they are trying to answer when making distinctions
between "circumstantial" and "direct" evidence-whether the
plaintiffs evidence is actually probative of discrimination, given
the content of the language, the identity of the speaker, and the
connection between the utterance and the alleged employment
action. Under the existing McDonnell Douglas standard, it is
difficult to make any principled argument for a court's
characterization of evidence as circumstantial, rather than
direct,"' and the terminology itself is confusing. Therefore, in
of discrimination, it should be acknowledged that others may find it appropriate to use
the "because of" standard found in § 2000e-2(a)(1) for single-motive cases. Outside of the
Title VII context, this proposal would recommend that the courts follow the operative text
of the particular discrimination statute.
363.
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140, at 340-41 (noting that textualism
strives to adhere to language "chosen by the legislature").
364.
See generally Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDuS. &
COM. L. REV. 431, 433-42 (1966) (discussing the legislative history of Title VII).
365.
See, e.g., Hegger v. Visteon Auto. Sys., Inc., No. 05-5256, 2006 WL 1526092, at
*2 (6th Cir. June 2, 2006) ("Direct evidence requires a conclusion by the fact finder that
unlawful discrimination was at least a 'motivating factor' for the employer's actions.");
Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 440 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 2006) (illustrating a
successful use of the motivating factor inquiry).
366.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Sugg, Nos. 04-3049, 04-3187, 2006 WL 1445025, at *8-10
(8th Cir. May 26, 2006) (illustrating a successful use of the motivating factor inquiry in a
mixed-motive context); Shakir v. Prairie View A&M Univ., No. 05-20010, 2006 WL
1209361, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2006) (noting that plaintiff may use direct or
circumstantial evidence).
367.
See, e.g., Bergman v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 04-6435, 2006 WL
126758, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2006) (finding that pregnant plaintiff only presented
circumstantial evidence when her supervisor told her that she was a risk the employer
was not willing to take, and then terminated her); Peyton v. Kellermeyer Co., No. 03-
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many instances, use of the statutory language will relieve the
courts of evaluating whether the evidence is direct or
circumstantial, and more carefully focus their attention on
whether the evidence is probative of discrimination.
One response to using the statutory language as a test would
be that such a resolution fails to account for problems in
analyzing discrimination cases that existed prior to the
formulation of McDonnell Douglas. However, as discussed earlier
in this Article, it does not appear that prior to the test's adoption
that courts were having great difficulty making distinctions
between cases where the plaintiff had presented evidence of
discrimination and those where the plaintiff had not. 368 None of
the McDonnell Douglas opinions discuss any wide-scale confusion
within the law in this regard.36 9
One suggested benefit of McDonnell Douglas is that it forces
a defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its conduct. 30" However, it seems difficult to fathom a case in
which the court would not be provided with this information,
either through the plaintiffs discovery efforts or through the
defendant's articulation of that reason either on summary
judgment or at trial.
Given the other problems created by the test, any de
minimis benefit that the second step provides does not merit
further use of the test. Further, there is no evidence that
employers were refraining from providing reasons for their
conduct before the test was articulated. Again, it is not clear that
adoption of this second prong was a response to existing
analytical or evidentiary problems. 1
Although the proof structure suggested here jettisons the
three-part framework of the test, the suggested structure still
maintains a proper place for the ultimate holding of McDonnell
Douglas. McDonnell Douglas continues to maintain validity to
the extent it intended to make it clear that an employer may be
liable for discrimination if it fails to hire a qualified individual for

1657, 2004 WL 2625029, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2004) (describing the distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence as "murky at best").
368.
See supra text accompanying notes 268-272, 277-280.
369. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) (noting that
matters of discrimination are to be treated as all other fact questions).
370.
See Davis, supra note 6, at 861 (observing that the McDonnell Douglas
framework compels the defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory justification for its
adverse employment actions).
371.
See Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218-19 (10th Cir. 1972)
(illustrating that the absence of the McDonnell Douglas framework did not prevent
defendants from coming forward with their claims).
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a job and offers a false reason for its conduct.372 Indeed, in some
cases, it will still be helpful to use the McDonnell Douglas
factors, even if the test is eventually eliminated. For example, in
failure-to-hire cases where the employer's proffered reason for its
conduct is the plaintiffs lack of qualifications, it makes sense to
consider the issues addressed by McDonnell Douglas. What
makes the test unsound from both statutory and practical
vantage points, is that it only describes one part of the universe
of discrimination claims. Unfortunately, courts have spent
countless wasted efforts
trying to cram dissimilar fact patterns
373
into the framework.

To give proper credit to McDonnell Douglas, the thirty years
the courts have spent struggling with the intricacies of the test
have provided a rich source of discussion about which types of
cases support claims of discrimination. Pretext will be important
in some cases, where the plaintiff has evidence that the
employer's proffered reason for its action may not be accurate.
However, thinking about claims through the lens of pretext is not
always helpful, especially when the facts are not clear regarding
whether the case should proceed under a mixed-motive or singlemotive framework.
Likewise, the employer's treatment of similarly situated
employees will be the key inquiry in certain discrimination cases,
but will not play a role in others. If the employer asserts that the
plaintiffs qualifications or job performance resulted in an
employment action, consideration of an employee's qualifications
is probably relevant to the overall inquiry of whether
discrimination occurred. However, in cases where an employer
claims to have based a decision on criteria other than
qualifications, the qualifications of the employee may carry little
probative value in determining whether discrimination occurred.
Additionally, this suggestion places employment lawsuits
more in line with other types of litigation, where the courts
typically consider the elements of the plaintiffs cause of action
and then determine whether there is sufficient evidence
(depending on the standard required by the procedural posture)
for the plaintiff to proceed or prevail.7 4 While in some cases it
372. See Chambers, supra note 100, at 118 (demonstrating that the McDonnell
Douglas court required finding for the plaintiff if the employer offered a fabricated reason
for the dismissal).
373. See, e.g., Eastridge v. R.I. Coll., 996 F. Supp. 161, 166-67 (D.R.I. 1998) (showing
problems that result when analyzing a reverse discrimination case under the McDonnell
Douglas framework).
374. See, e.g., Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003)
(Hartz, J., writing separately) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas framework adopts a
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may be difficult to determine whether the plaintiff has presented
such evidence, this is not a fault of the suggested proof scheme,
but rather a difficulty inherent in discrimination itself
Eliminating or significantly restricting the applicability of
McDonnell Douglas will simplify this inquiry by focusing courts'
attention on the ultimate issue, changing employment law to be
more procedurally akin to other types of litigation, and
encouraging courts to consider discrimination claims in their
entirety, rather than as segmented portions of a mechanical
test.375
V.

CONCLUSION

For some, the lack of statutory support for McDonnell
Douglas is not problematic. In fact, it could be argued that it is
just one example of the many statutory constructions enacted by
the courts without due consideration for statutory heritage.
However, McDonnell Douglas's lack of statutory support has
created real problems in interpreting the employment
discrimination statutes-problems that have unfortunately
plagued and wasted the attention of numerous courts and
litigants over the past four decades." 6
From a policy perspective, reconsideration of the standard is
especially necessary because it appears to have few benefits. 7
Indeed, many have argued that the benefits of McDonnell
Douglas have been "eroded" by subsequent case law."7 And, one
commentator noted that the only "marginal benefit of McDonnell
Douglas... [is] forcing the defendant to articulate an
explanation for the challenged employment action."7 9 However,
as noted earlier in the Article, prior to McDonnell Douglas,
defendants were already proffering the reasons for their
employment actions."' Perhaps, the most severe critique of the

unique approach in evaluating sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence).
375.
See, e.g., Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(eschewing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis in favor of proceeding
"directly to the real issues presented by a plaintiff s [sic] claims").
376.
See generally Davis, supra note 308, at 711-26 (criticizing all aspects of the
three-part McDonnell Douglas framework).
377.
See id. at 711 (discussing confusion and uncertainty caused by the McDonnell
Douglas framework).
378.
See Davis, supra note 6, at 862 (suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas
framework has largely been superseded).
379.
Id.
380.
Id. at 861 (arguing that employers submit proof that their actions were
nondiscriminatory even without the McDonnell Douglas framework).
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test is that "[elven when applied properly, McDonnell
381 Douglas
may defeat an otherwise meritorious civil rights claim."
While these policy arguments are important, one of the
strongest arguments in favor of eliminating the standard, or at
least diminishing its importance, is that the standard was
adopted without proper regard to the operative text, the
legislative history, and the broad policies of Title VII. While it
arguably may have been appropriate to justify this lapse in the
past by claiming that the test was merely an evidentiary
standard and could be created through the Supreme Court's
supervisory authority, this argument is no longer compelling.
Courts have begun to water down or eliminate McDonnell
Douglas's use as an evidentiary standard, and, in the process,
weakened the argument for its continued legitimacy.3 82 Now is
the time to reconsider the legal heritage and appropriateness of
McDonnell Douglas.

381.
382.

Davis, supra note 308, at 707.
See supra Part IV.A.

